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Scrutinizing Federal Electoral  
Qualifications 
DEREK T. MULLER* 
Candidates for federal office must meet several constitutional qualifications. 
Sometimes, whether a candidate meets those qualifications is a matter of dispute. 
Courts and litigants often assume that a state has the power to include or exclude 
candidates from the ballot on the basis of the state’s own scrutiny of candidates’ 
qualifications. Courts and litigants also often assume that the matter is not left to the 
states but to Congress or another political actor. But those contradictory 
assumptions have never been examined, until now. 
This Article compiles the mandates of the Constitution, the precedents of 
Congress, the practices of states administering the ballot, and judicial precedents. It 
concludes that states have no role in evaluating the qualifications of congressional 
candidates—the matter is reserved to the people and to Congress. It then concludes 
that while states have the power to scrutinize qualifications for presidential 
candidates, they are not obligated to do so under the Constitution. If state 
legislatures choose to exercise that power, it comes at the risk of ceding reviewing 
power to election officials, partisan litigants, and the judiciary. The Article then 
offers a framework for future litigation that protects the guarantees of the 
Constitution, the rights of the voters, and the authorities of the sovereigns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Is President Barack Obama a “natural born Citizen”1 of the United States? Is 
Senator John McCain? Was Vice President Dick Cheney an “inhabitant”2 of 
Wyoming or of Texas? The consensus answer to the questions regarding Mr. Obama, 
Mr. McCain, and Mr. Cheney, on the merits, has been yes,3 but such answers do not 
come without dissent (legitimate or not).4 These and similar questions have been asked 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 2. Id. amend. XII. 
 3. See, e.g., Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (finding that voters’ 
generalized injury was insufficient for Article III standing but entering judgment that vice 
presidential candidate Dick Cheney was not an “inhabitant” of Texas), aff’d, 244 F.3d 134 (5th 
Cir. 2000); Farrar v. Obama, OSAH-SECSTATE-CE-1215136-60-MALIHI (Ga. Office of State 
Admin. Hearings Feb. 3, 2012) (holding that a person born in the United States is a natural born 
citizen regardless of the citizenship of his parents and relying on Arkeny v. Governor of Ind., 916 
N.E.2d 678, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), which held that a person born in the United States is a 
natural born citizen regardless of the citizenship of his parents); Resolution Recognizing that 
John Sidney McCain, III, Is a Natural Born Citizen, S. Res. 511, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted) 
(resolving unanimously that Senator McCain is a natural born citizen); Laurence H. Tribe 
& Theodore B. Olson, Opinion Letter, Presidents and Citizenship, 2 J.L. 509, 509 (2012) 
(concluding that Senator McCain is a natural born citizen); Dan Pfeiffer, President Obama’s 
Long Form Birth Certificate, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Apr. 27, 2011, 8:57 AM), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/04/27/president-obamas-long-form-birth-certificate. 
 4. See, e.g., Jones, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 715 (“This is an action by three Texas registered 
voters who allege that Richard B. Cheney . . . , nominee of the Republican Party for Vice 
President of the United States, is an ‘inhabitant’ of the state of Texas, and that under the 
Twelfth Amendment to the United States Constitution, members of the Electoral College from 
the state of Texas . . . are prohibited from voting for both Governor George W. Bush . . . for 
the office of President of the United States and for Secretary Cheney for the office of Vice 
President.”); JEROME R. CORSI, WHERE’S THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE?: THE CASE THAT BARACK 
OBAMA IS NOT ELIGIBLE TO BE PRESIDENT (2011); Gabriel J. Chin, Commentary, Why Senator 
John McCain Cannot Be President: Eleven Months and a Hundred Yards Short of Citizenship, 
107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1 (2008), http://www.michiganlawreview.org
/firstimpressions/vol107/chin.pdf (arguing that Congress did not confer citizenship to those 
born in the Panama Canal Zone prior to August 4, 1937, thus preventing Senator McCain from 
qualifying as a “natural born” citizen); Lawrence Friedman, An Idea Whose Time Has Come—
The Curious History, Uncertain Effect, and Need for Amendment of the “Natural Born 
Citizen” Requirement for the Presidency, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 137, 143–49 (2007) (describing 
uncertainty over the Natural Born Citizen Clause); Jonathan Turley, Court Redux: Is McCain 
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before.5 They are being asked today.6 And they will assuredly be asked again.7 
The debate over these questions has typically been one about the substance of 
each qualification: pundits ask whether or not a candidate meets a qualification for 
federal office. But there is an underlying issue less examined: Once the candidate is 
listed on or excluded from the ballot, who has the power to resolve disputes about 
qualifications? This issue has generally been viewed as a question about the power 
of the courts to determine qualifications, or as a question about the proper parties to 
raise such challenges.8 Indeed, litigation reflects two assumptions from plaintiffs: 
that courts may adjudicate whether candidates should appear on the 
state-administered ballot and that courts have the power to order the state to add or 
to remove a candidate.9 
Any attempt to answer these questions through litigation has been disastrous. 
Cases proceed inconsistently through administrative hearings and federal courts; 
they are sometimes dismissed on procedural grounds. When they reach substantive 
matters, judges and litigants have often thought less about the proper reasoning and 
                                                                                                                 
 
Ineligible to Be President?, ROLL CALL (Mar. 6, 2008, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/53_104/-22409-1.html (claiming that whether Mr. McCain is 
a natural born citizen is uncertain). 
 5. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jack Maskell, Legislative Attorney, Cong. Research Serv., 
to Cong. Offices, Qualifications for the Office of President of the United States and Legal 
Challenges to the Eligibility of a Candidate, at 13 n.67 (Apr. 3, 2009), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/41131059/CRS-Congressional-Internal-Memo-What-to-Tell-Your
-Constituents-Regarding-Obama-Eligibility-Questions [hereinafter Maskell Memorandum] 
(Chester A. Arthur was born to a citizen mother and a noncitizen father.); Jill A. Pryor, Note, The 
Natural-Born Citizen Clause and Presidential Eligibility: An Approach for Resolving Two 
Hundred Years of Uncertainty, 97 YALE L.J. 881, 882 n.6 (1988) (noting the previous disputes 
on the constitutionality of the potential candidacies of Barry Goldwater (born in Arizona before 
it was a state), Lowell Weicker (born in Paris, France), George Romney (born of American 
parents in Mexico), Christian C. Herter (born of American parents in France), and Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Jr. (born in Canada)). 
 6. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Lindsay v. Bowen, 750 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(No. 13-15085). 
 7. See, e.g., Hendrik Hertzberg, Strongman: Arnold Schwarzenegger and California’s 
Recall Race, NEW YORKER, Sept. 29, 2003, at 42 (reporting Senator Orrin Hatch’s attempt on 
July 10, 2002, to introduce a constitutional amendment which would make naturalized citizens 
eligible for the office of President); Paul West, Questions About the Qualifications of Ted Cruz, 
the GOP’s Newest Star, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug
/01/news/la-pn-questions-about-the-qualifications-of-ted-cruz-the-gops-newest-star-20120801; 
Aaron Blake, Can Ted Cruz Run for President? And Should He?, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/03/20/supporters-push-for-ted-cruz-for
-president/ (questioning if current Senator Ted Cruz, born in Calgary, Alberta, to an American 
mother and Cuban father, is a natural born citizen, and comparing Cruz’s circumstances to those 
of Governor George Romney and Senator John McCain). 
 8. See, e.g., Stephen Parks, The Birthers’ Attacks and the Judiciary’s Article III “Defense” 
of the Obama Presidency, 38 S.U. L. REV. 179 (2011); Daniel P. Tokaji, Commentary, The 
Justiciability of Eligibility: May Courts Decide Who Can Be President?, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 31 (2008), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol107/tokaji.pdf. 
 9. See infra Part II.C (identifying lack of meaningful judicial analysis of the power to 
review qualifications). 
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instead litigated on the basis of seat-of-the-pants logic that posits the “right” result 
with little context or constitutional scrutiny.10 
But there is an assumption underlying even this inquiry that has escaped any 
meaningful academic inquiry: What power, if any, do states have to determine the 
constitutional qualifications of federal candidates? States are tasked with, among other 
things, administering the ballot and conducting federal elections.11 But that does not 
necessarily mean that states are also tasked with the responsibility of evaluating whether 
a federal candidate meets constitutional qualifications for office and then including or 
excluding candidates depending on whether they meet those qualifications. 
This Article examines whether states have the power to evaluate the constitutional 
qualifications of candidates for federal office. The Article compiles the mandates of 
the Constitution, the precedents of Congress, the practices of states administering the 
ballot, and scraps of judicial precedents in litigated cases. Finally, these multifarious 
concepts are synthesized to identify the proper role of the states. 
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I examines the constitutional 
qualifications for candidates for the Presidency, the Vice Presidency, the House of 
Representatives, and the Senate. It classifies these qualifications into different 
categories, including whether a lack of qualification is “curable” and whether it can 
be cured during the term in which a candidate is elected. These categories reveal that 
officials may scrutinize different kinds of qualifications differently, depending on 
their classification. 
Part II traces the judicial disputes over qualifications and how courts grapple with 
the merits inquiries and their own institutional roles. It identifies litigation over 
congressional and presidential candidates when a state has excluded them from the 
ballot, or when the state has included them and a party seeks to exclude them. It 
concludes that courts are generally highly deferential to the political process and have 
been reluctant to remove anyone from the ballot over a qualifications dispute, 
generally finding no duty for the state to investigate qualifications or to exclude 
arguably unqualified candidates. 
Part III ascertains who has the power to scrutinize qualifications. It notes that 
voters and presidential electors have broad discretion in the discharge of their duties, 
and they may, rightly or wrongly, reach conclusions about qualifications when 
voting. Congress has the sole power to adjudicate the qualifications of its own 
members; its role in evaluating the qualifications of presidential or vice presidential 
candidates is more complicated, but its practice has generally been one that reflects 
an ability to adjudicate the qualifications of its members. Part III then concludes with 
an examination of the states’ power to administer the ballot, a power that postdates 
any prior assumption of power left in the hands of the voters or a governmental body. 
Part IV examines the possible scenarios in which parties seek to include or 
exclude a candidate from the ballot on the basis of qualifications. It concludes that 
states have no role in evaluating the qualifications of candidates for the Senate and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
thereof . . . .”). 
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the House of Representatives. That task is left to Congress directly, and to the people 
indirectly. Any such legislation in the states is constitutionally forbidden. 
The Article then finds that states have no constitutional obligation to evaluate the 
qualifications of candidates for president or vice president. It is within their power to 
choose—or to allow the voters or presidential electors to choose—candidates of 
dubious qualification. But states do have the power to evaluate qualifications if they 
so desire. If a state desires to investigate the qualifications of executive candidates, 
then typical judicial review would apply to any decision to include them or exclude 
them. This Part harmonizes existing case law and explains the proper framework for 
considering such litigation. 
Finally, Part V reviews existing state legislation, which presents a divergence of 
views about the proper role of states in reviewing qualifications. It concludes with a 
series of advisory provisions for future legislation, statutory interpretation, and 
litigation, consistent with the appropriate authority of states in federal elections. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR FEDERAL OFFICE 
An inquiry into how and whether states may examine the constitutional 
qualifications for federal office logically begins with an examination of what the 
qualifications are. There are four elected federal offices enumerated in the Constitution: 
Representative, Senator, President, and Vice President. Each has express 
qualifications, which this Part identifies. This Part then classifies them based on how 
Congress and other actors have interpreted them over the years, which will later help 
answer the question of who should have the power to scrutinize qualifications. 
A. Qualifications for Members of the House of Representatives 
At least twenty-five years old. Article I requires that a representative attain “the 
Age of twenty five Years.”12 Ostensibly, no provision of the Constitution could be 
more impervious to legal challenge.13 And while a need to interpret this clause has 
not yet arisen, the possibility for such a challenge conceivably exists.14 
Seven years a citizen of the United States. Aliens have often been excluded from 
public office.15 For a candidate to be eligible for the House of Representatives, the 
Constitution requires something more than mere citizenship: it requires a minimal 
period of time as a citizen, but a lower threshold than that required for President.16 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. 
 13. See, e.g., Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“No provisions of the Constitution, barring only those that draw 
on arithmetic, as in prescribing the qualifying age for a President and members of a Congress 
or the length of their tenure of office, are more explicit and specific than those pertaining to 
courts established under Article III.”). 
 14. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 536 (1983) 
(suggesting that good reason may support alternative interpretations such as percentage of life 
expectancy or minimum number of years after puberty). 
 15. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Derek T. Muller, Invisible 
Federalism and the Electoral College, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1237, 1275–76 (2012). 
 16. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring seven years’ citizenship to run for 
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Inhabitant of that state. An individual must be an inhabitant of the state from 
which she is elected.17 “Inhabitant” means something less than “resident”18 and 
something more than “sojourner.”19 Inhabitancy is measured at the time “when 
elected” to avoid a lengthy temporal-residency qualification.20 
Not a holder of another civil office, or a recipient of increased emoluments. The 
Incompatibility and Ineligibility Clauses provide, “No Senator or Representative shall, 
during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the 
Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments 
whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office 
under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in 
Office.”21 This prohibition is a disqualification on taking another office or receiving an 
emolument while serving as a representative. In 1817, for instance, Elias Earle of South 
Carolina was elected to the House while serving as a postmaster but resigned his office 
before taking his seat and was found to be entitled to it.22 Congress extensively 
considered the definition of “office” in 1898, ultimately finding that four members 
vacated their seats upon accepting commissions in the army.23 
Not disqualified from federal office after impeachment and conviction. A 
candidate who has been impeached, then disqualified in the discretion of the Senate, 
is ineligible to serve in Congress.24 
Not one who engaged in insurrection or rebellion. One of the lesser-known 
provisions of the Reconstruction Amendments is Section 3 of the Fourteenth 
                                                                                                                 
 
the House of Representatives), with id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No Person except a natural born 
Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall 
be eligible to the Office of President . . . .”). 
 17. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. 
 18. See Schaefer v. Townsend, 215 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 2000) (examining the 
Records of the Federal Convention and concluding that the Framers rejected an in-state 
residency requirement). 
 19. See, e.g., 1 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
OF THE UNITED STATES § 369 (1907) [hereinafter HINDS’ PRECEDENTS] (reporting the 
conclusion of a committee of Congress that Jennings Pigott was a “sojourner” and was not an 
“inhabitant” of North Carolina when elected in 1862). 
 20. See, e.g., Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 589 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2) (examining history of inhabitancy requirement and 
noting instance when Congress seated elected representatives who had moved into a state two 
weeks before the election). 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison) 
(“during the time of his service, must be in no office under the United States”). This prohibition 
may not extend to the President. See Seth Barrett Tillman, Why Our Next President May Keep 
His or Her Senate Seat: A Conjecture on the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause, 4 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 1 (2009). 
 22. HINDS’ PRECEDENTS, supra note 19, § 498. 
 23. See H.R. REP. NO. 55-2205, pt. 1, at 69–70 (1899); HINDS’ PRECEDENTS, supra note 
19, §§ 493–494. 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. For more discussion in the context of presidential 
candidates, see infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. But see Benjamin Cassady, “You’ve 
Got Your Crook, I’ve Got Mine”: Why the Disqualification Clause Doesn’t (Always) 
Disqualify, 32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 209 (2014). 
2015] SCRUTINIZING FEDERAL ELECTORAL QUALIFICATIONS 565 
 
Amendment. It disqualifies from office those who previously took an oath under the 
Constitution of the United States but “have engaged in insurrection or rebellion” 
against the United States “or [have] given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.”25 
The disability works against those who “hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States,”26 which presumably includes the office of the President.27 Congress, 
however, has the power to remove the disability by a two-thirds vote.28 
Elected. A qualification “so basic that it is not often cited as a qualification at all” 
is the requirement of being elected to office.29 
Timing of qualifications. A candidate must possess each of these qualifications 
upon being seated, not necessarily at the time voted into office.30 
No additional qualifications. Congress’s understanding of its power to add 
qualifications has a checkered history, and its members’ views are often divided.31 
For instance, the House determined in 1868 that John Young Brown of Kentucky 
could not take a loyalty oath prescribed by the House, because the House concluded 
he had given comfort to the enemy.32 The House then vigorously debated whether 
Congress could add to the three qualifications of age, citizenship, and inhabitancy.33 
Hinds’ Precedents concludes that “it seems to have been assumed by the Committee 
on Elections, if not by the House itself, that the House alone might not add to the 
qualifications prescribed by the Constitution.”34 However, Mr. Brown was still 
excluded from his seat.35 
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has held that these qualifications are 
exclusive; states may not add to them.36 Congress may not refuse to seat a member 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3. 
 26. Id.  
 27. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 164–66 (2005); 
Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Essay, Is the Presidential Succession Law 
Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 136 n.143 (1995). 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 3. 
 29. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Are Congressional Term Limits Constitutional?, 18 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 22 (1994); cf. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 26 n.23 (1972) (“One 
of those qualifications is that a Senator be elected by the people of his State.”). 
 30. See infra notes 177–81 and accompanying text (describing Congress’s practice of 
adjudicating age based upon the time a candidate presents credentials to the chamber). 
 31. See generally John C. Eastman, Open to Merit of Every Description? An Historical 
Assessment of the Constitution’s Qualifications Clauses, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 89, 91–102 
(1995) (examining four historical instances in which Congress debated the power to add 
qualifications to the ones enumerated in the Constitution). 
 32. HINDS’ PRECEDENTS, supra note 19, § 449. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 805 (1995) (“In the absence of any 
constitutional delegation to the States of power to add qualifications to those enumerated in 
the Constitution, such a power does not exist.”); Exon v. Tiemann, 279 F. Supp. 609, 613 (D. 
Neb. 1968) (rejecting a state requirement that a member of Congress reside in the 
congressional district he represents); Hellmann v. Collier, 141 A.2d 908 (Md. 1958) (same); 
accord 5 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 404 (1836) (“The qualifications of electors and elected were 
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for failing to meet a unilaterally imposed qualification not enumerated in the 
Constitution.37 And judicial intervention in cases involving additional qualifications 
effectively precludes Congress from adding them.38 
Occasionally, the line between “qualifications” and mere “regulations” of election 
procedures is difficult to discern. For instance, “sore loser” laws, which exclude a 
candidate from the general election ballot if that candidate ran in another party’s 
political primary and lost, have been upheld as permissible regulations, not additional 
qualifications.39 In Storer v. Brown,40 affiliation with a political party before 
obtaining ballot access was considered a “procedural ground rule,” not an additional 
qualification.41 “Reasonable” election-related procedures that may limit ballot access 
or identify only “serious” candidates are acceptable regulations of the times, places, 
and manner of elections.42 
B. Qualifications for Members of the Senate 
The qualifications for members of the Senate are largely similar to the 
qualifications for members of the House: 
At least thirty years old. Unlike Representatives, who must be at least twenty-five 
years of age, Senators must be thirty years old.43 
Nine years a citizen of the United States. While representatives must be seven 
years a citizen, senators must be citizens for at least nine years.44 
Inhabitant of that state. Similar to Representatives, Senators must also be 
inhabitants of the state.45 
                                                                                                                 
 
fundamental articles in a Republican Govt. and ought to be fixed by the Constitution.”); see 
also Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853, 858 (2d Cir. 1980) (compiling cases). See generally 
Lowenstein, supra note 29. 
 37. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969) (“[S]ince [plaintiff] was duly elected 
by the voters . . . and was not ineligible to serve under any provision of the Constitution, the 
House was without power to exclude him from its membership.”). 
 38. See id. at 550 (concluding that the case was justiciable and not a political question); 
Note, Voter and Officeholder Qualifications, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2230, 2236–37 (2006). 
 39. See generally Michael S. Kang, Sore Loser Laws and Democratic Contestation, 99 
GEO. L.J. 1013 (2011) (discussing prevalence of “sore loser” laws). 
 40.  415 U.S. 724 (1974). 
 41. See Lowenstein, supra note 29, at 23. 
 42. See, e.g., Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (upholding Texas statute 
requiring signatures equal to one percent of vote from previous gubernatorial election); 
Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (upholding Georgia’s requirement that third-party 
candidates file a petition signed by at least five percent of voters to have their names placed 
on the ballot in the general election); Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding 
“resign-to-run” statute that required state court judges to resign their position before running 
for Congress was not an additional qualification). 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.; see also Strong v. Breaux, 612 So. 2d 111 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam). In 2014, 
Senator Mary Landrieu was challenged on similar grounds before the election. A state court 
dismissed the claim, concluding that inhabitancy attached at the time of election, not before, 
which meant that the claim was not ripe. See Julia O’Donoghue, Judge Throws out Suit 
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Not a holder of another civil office, or a recipient of increased emoluments.46 
Not disqualified from federal office after impeachment and conviction.47 
Not one who engaged in insurrection or rebellion.48 
Elected.49 
Timing of qualifications. As with members of the House of Representatives, the 
qualifications usually must exist when the member is presented to Congress.50 
No additional qualifications. As with the House, these qualifications are 
exclusive.51 
C. Qualifications for the Executive 
Natural born citizen. Article II of the Constitution provides, “No Person except a 
natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of 
this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President . . . .”52 No federal court 
has squarely reached the meaning of the Natural Born Citizen Clause of Article II, as 
standing proves a high hurdle for such challenges.53 Questions surrounding the “natural 
born” requirement primarily concern persons born in the territories of the United States, 
on American bases outside of the United States, persons born to a U.S. diplomat in 
another country, and American Indians born on reservations.54 
At least thirty-five years old. Article II also dictates that “neither shall any 
Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty 
five Years . . . .”55 Like the requirement for Congress, it is fairly straightforward.56 
                                                                                                                 
 
Challenging Mary Landrieu’s Residency, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 5, 2014, 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/09/landrieu_residency_court_case.html. 
 46. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
 47. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 48. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. 
 49. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 50. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 51. See, e.g., Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp. 729 (D.N.M. 1972) (rejecting state-created 
two years’ residency requirement as unconstitutional); Comm. to Recall Robert Menendez 
from the Office of U.S. Senator v. Wells, 7 A.3d 720 (N.J. 2010) (rejecting recall mechanism 
for U.S. Senators as an unconstitutional additional qualification). 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 53. See, e.g., Berg v. Obama, 586 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2009); Hollander v. McCain, 566 F. 
Supp. 2d 63 (D.N.H. 2008). But standing is not the same obstacle in state courts and could 
conceivably be used to deny ballot access. See Keyes v. Bowen, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 207, 209 (Ct. 
App. 2010) (adjudicating a presidential candidate’s claim but finding no duty for the state or 
elector to inquire into a candidate’s qualifications). Additionally, courts have occasionally 
defined the meaning of the Clause. See, e.g., Robinson v. Bowen, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (N.D. 
Cal. 2008); Ankeny v. Governor of Ind., 916 N.E.2d 678 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Despite some 
uncertainty, there is some consensus as to who qualifies as a natural born citizen. It is settled that 
persons born in the United States qualify as natural born, but persons born to aliens outside of 
the United States do not qualify. Pryor, supra note 5, at 881–82. 
 54. See William T. Han, Beyond Presidential Eligibility: The Natural Born Citizen Clause as 
a Source of Birthright Citizenship, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 457 (2010); Pryor, supra note 5, at 881–82. 
 55. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 56. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. 
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Fourteen-year resident. An individual must also have been “fourteen Years a 
Resident within the United States.”57 Authority suggests the fourteen-year residency 
requirement, in conjunction with the alternative to being a natural born citizen (that 
is, being a citizen at the time of the Constitution’s adoption), sought to qualify all 
fifty-five delegates of the 1787 Federal Convention.58 In contemporary application, 
the residency requirement, like the age requirement, acts as a temporary bar for a 
natural born citizen.59 
Not term limited. The 22nd Amendment bars any person who has served two 
four-year terms as President, or who has served one four-year term and acted as 
President for more than two years of a term to which another individual was elected.60 
Not disqualified from federal office after impeachment and conviction. The 
Constitution provides that “Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend 
further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office 
of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States . . . .”61 The Presidency is an “Office 
of honor, Trust or Profit,” but the decision to disqualify an impeached official is a 
matter of discretion left to the Senate.62 
Not one who engaged in insurrection or rebellion. Also, similar to the 
requirements for Congress, a candidate who has engaged in insurrection or rebellion 
is ineligible, unless Congress removes the disability.63 
Not an inhabitant of the same state as the Vice President. There is one slightly 
unusual qualification, if it can even be properly called a qualification. A presidential 
elector may not cast a vote for a presidential candidate and a vice presidential 
candidate if both candidates are inhabitants of that elector’s state.64 As the Electoral 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 58. See Sarah Helene Duggin & Mary Beth Collins, ‘Natural Born’ in the USA: The Striking 
Unfairness and Dangerous Ambiguity of the Constitution’s Presidential Qualifications Clause 
and Why We Need to Fix It, 85 B.U. L. REV. 53, 67 n.55 (2005). At the constitutional convention, 
there was a concern that even this exception was too generous, as no number of years could 
prepare a foreigner for the office of President; but “as men of other lands had spilled their blood 
in the cause of the United States, and had assisted at every stage of the formation of their 
institutions, on the 7th of September it was unanimously settled that foreign-born residents of 
fourteen years who should be citizens at the time of the formation of the constitution are eligible 
to the office of president.” United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 715 (1898) (Fuller, 
C.J., dissenting) (quoting 2 GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 192 (1882). 
 59. John R. Hein, Comment, Born in the U.S.A., but Not Natural Born: How 
Congressional Territorial Policy Bars Native-Born Puerto Ricans from the Presidency, 11 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 423, 423 n.3 (2009). 
 60. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. 
 61. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7; see also Amar & Amar, supra note 27, at 114–16. 
 62. Cf. Waggoner v. Hastings, 816 F. Supp. 716, 719 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (examining the 
situation concerning Alcee Hastings, elected to the House of Representatives after being 
impeached and removed from a federal judgeship). 
 63. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text; see also HINDS’ PRECEDENTS, supra 
note 19, § 454. 
 64. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (“The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and 
vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same 
State with themselves.”), amended by id. amend. XII (“The Electors shall meet in their 
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College was originally conceived, electors cast two votes; after the votes were 
tabulated, the candidate with the most votes became President, and the candidate 
with the second-most votes became Vice President.65 There were a number of early 
misfires, including “vote throwing” to ensure that John Adams would be Vice 
President in 1789 and 1792;66 miscommunicated strategizing in 1796 that gave Mr. 
Adams the Presidency and his political enemy Thomas Jefferson the Vice 
Presidency;67 and the electoral tie in 1800 between Mr. Jefferson and Aaron Burr, 
which then prompted a thirty-six round runoff in the House.68 
The Twelfth Amendment allowed electors to designate one candidate for 
President and one candidate for Vice President.69 This small change would avoid the 
problems from these first four presidential elections. 
But one element of the original system remained. There was a concern that each state’s 
electors would prefer two candidates from the electors’ home state.70 To avoid excessive 
provincialism, the Constitution mandated that an elector could not vote for candidates if 
both were inhabitants of the elector’s state.71 Inhabitancy was measured at the time the 
electors cast their votes for the candidates.72 This would ensure that each elector would 
always vote for at least one candidate who was an inhabitant of another state. 
It would be perfectly acceptable for an elector to vote for two candidates of the 
same state if that elector was not an inhabitant of that state. And this has happened—
for instance, in 1792, four Kentucky electors cast votes for both George Washington 
and Mr. Jefferson, even though both were residents of Virginia.73 
And it would be entirely possible for candidates to win the Presidency and Vice 
Presidency as residents of the same state. After all, if a ticket obtained a majority of 
the electoral vote without a need for the electoral votes of the ticket’s home state, the 
ticket would still win the Presidency and Vice Presidency. 
Accordingly, the inhabitancy provision is, strictly speaking, not a qualification, 
but a restriction on electors voting for certain candidates if those candidates possess 
certain (prohibited) qualifications.74 But as it operates as a de facto qualification on 
presidential tickets in modern practice, and as Congress may have the power to refuse 
                                                                                                                 
 
respective states, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, 
shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves . . . .”). 
 65. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
 66. See SVEND PETERSEN, A STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTIONS 11 tbls.3 & 4 (Greenwood Press 1981) (1963). 
 67. See id. at 12 tbl.5. 
 68. See id. at 13 tbl.6. 
 69. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 70. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 
at 368 (Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio Univ. Press 1984) (1840). 
 71. See Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713, 720–21 (N.D. Tex. 2000); cf. THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing how the electoral system helps oppose “cabal, 
intrigue, and corruption”). 
 72. Thomas Michael Susman, State of Inhabitancy of Presidential and Vice-Presidential 
Candidates and the Electoral College Vote, 47 TEX. L. REV. 779, 789 (1969). 
 73. PETERSEN, supra note 66, at 11 tbl.4. 
 74. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 231 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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to count the votes of electors who violate this voting requirement,75 it is appropriate 
to consider it a “qualification” for the purposes of this catalog. 
Person. Almost an afterthought, the President of the United States must be a 
“[p]erson.”76 In at least one instance involving a dead candidate, there has been a 
serious question as to what it means to be a “person” for purposes of Article II.77 
Qualifications for Vice President. The requirements for Vice President are the 
same as those for President—“no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of 
President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.”78 But some 
have argued that a term-limited President could still run for Vice President: a 
term-limited President would still be “eligible” for the office of President, as the 22nd 
Amendment restricts only persons “elected to the office of the President more than 
twice,” and the Twelfth Amendment only bars those “ineligible to the office” of 
President.79 Accordingly, the argument goes, a term-limited President who becomes 
Vice President is eligible for the office of President according to the rules of 
succession, but he is not eligible to be elected as President. The stronger view may 
be that once a President has met the term limits of the 22nd Amendment, he is 
ineligible to be President.80 
Qualifications for presidential electors. State legislatures have the exclusive 
power to select the mode of appointing electors.81 Electors, however, may not be 
Senators, Representatives, or persons “holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the 
United States.”82 Courts have adopted a functional definition of who qualifies as an 
                                                                                                                 
 
 75. See infra notes 225–240 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s counting of 
electoral votes after the 1872 election). 
 76. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 77. See infra notes 227–233 and accompanying text. 
 78. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. But see Jamin Soderstrom, Note, Back to the Basics: Looking 
Again to State Constitutions for Guidance on Forming a More Perfect Vice Presidency, 35 PEPP. 
L. REV. 967 (2008) (suggesting alternatives to existing vice presidential office). 
 79. See, e.g., Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The Twice and Future President: 
Constitutional Interstices and the Twenty-Second Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 565, 619 (1999) 
(“[W]e do not believe an already twice-elected President is ‘constitutionally ineligible to the office 
of President.’” (emphasis in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XII)); Michael C. Dorf, The 
Case for a Gore-Clinton Ticket, FINDLAW (July 31, 2000), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf
/20000731.html (“[The language of the 22nd Amendment] only bars from the vice-presidency those 
persons who are ‘ineligible to the office’ of President. Clinton is not ineligible to the office of 
President, however. He is only disqualified (by the Twenty-Second Amendment) from being 
elected to that office.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XII)). 
 80. See, e.g., Matthew J. Franck, Constitutional Sleight of Hand, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (July 
31, 2007, 9:02 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/51444/constitutional
-sleight-hand/matthew-j-franck (“It follows from the 22nd Amendment that Bill Clinton, being 
‘constitutionally ineligible’ to be elected president, is ineligible to become president by another 
route. He is, in short, ineligible to be president, and therefore ineligible to become vice president 
under the 12th amendment.” (emphasis in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XII)). 
 81. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see also McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) 
(“[I]t is seen that from the formation of the government until now the practical construction of 
the clause has conceded plenary power to the state legislatures in the matter of the appointment 
of electors.”). 
 82. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Electors themselves are not “officers or agents of the 
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officeholder.83 They are subject to the same disqualification for engaging in 
insurrection or rebellion as other federal officials.84 Congress has independently 
evaluated the constitutional eligibility of electors on occasion.85 
Additional qualifications. It appears that states may add qualifications for 
presidential candidates. For instance, Professor Akhil Reed Amar has noted that, 
prior to the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment, it would have been lawful for 
states to prohibit women from running for federal office; since the enactment of 
women’s suffrage, Professor Amar notes that states are effectively required to allow 
women to run.86 Indeed, as the state legislature may direct the manner of selecting 
presidential electors, it seems that it might cabin the discretion of voters selecting 
presidential candidates in ways that it might not otherwise be able to do with 
congressional candidates.87 But courts have occasionally treated the holding in U.S. 
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,88 which found the qualifications for members of 
Congress enumerated in the Constitution as exclusive, applicable to presidential 
elections, too.89 
States, presumably, may add qualifications to presidential electors.90 It is 
incumbent upon the state legislature to select the manner in which presidential 
electors are selected.91 In the contemporary era, a prerequisite to winning 
appointment as an elector is winning the plurality of a popular vote.92 States 
condition the selection of electors in other ways, too. Michigan, for instance, requires 
electors to be citizens for ten years, and electors from each congressional district 
must reside and be registered to vote in that district for at least one year.93 As long as 
                                                                                                                 
 
United States.” In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890); see also Vasan Kesavan, The Very 
Faithless Elector?, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 123, 128–30 (2001). 
 83. See In re Corliss, 11 R.I. 638 (1876) (finding that a commissioner of the U.S. Centennial 
Commission occupied an “office of trust” disqualifying him from serving as an elector). 
 84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3. 
 85. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Conscientious Congressman’s Guide to the Electoral 
Count Act of 1887, 56 FLA. L. REV. 541, 559 n.100 (2004). 
 86. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 289 (2012). 
 87. See, e.g., Eliana Johnson, Rand v. the State of Kentucky, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (May 
29, 2014, 12:39 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/379060/rand-v-state-kentucky
-eliana-johnson (discussing history of and dispute concerning state laws that prohibit 
presidential candidates from simultaneously obtaining ballot access in the same election as 
congressional candidates). 
 88. 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 89. See, e.g., Nat’l Comm. of the U.S. Taxpayers Party v. Garza, 924 F. Supp. 71, 75 (W.D. 
Tex. 1996); accord John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court’s Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 
785–86 (2001) (citing U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. 779, for proposition that “the state’s power over 
the manner of the selection of presidential electors cannot go far beyond procedural matters,” 
which supports the reasoning in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam)). 
 90. See Kesavan, supra note 82, at 140–41. 
 91. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 92. Derek T. Muller, The Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote Interstate 
Compact, 6 ELECTION L.J. 372, 374 (2007). 
 93. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.41 (West 2008). 
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a state’s conditions do not violate some other provision of the U.S. Constitution,94 
additional qualifications are permitted. 
D. Classifications of Qualifications 
The foregoing analysis of these qualifications offers insight about similarities and 
differences among the qualifications. These qualifications may be classified into one 
of two primary categories: curable and incurable. 
“Curable” qualifications are those a candidate may meet if some intervening 
action or event occurs. They may require an action from the candidate (e.g., 
establishing inhabitancy, resigning an incompatible office, becoming a citizen); the 
passage of time (e.g., age restrictions, period of citizenship); or an act of Congress 
(e.g., removal of disability for candidates who engaged in insurrection or rebellion). 
“Incurable” qualifications are ones that cannot be met by an intervening action. 
Those include being a “person” (i.e., a living human being), a “natural born Citizen,” 
not term limited, and not disqualified from federal office after impeachment and 
removal. Of course, theoretically, incurable qualifications may be cured by a 
constitutional amendment that abolishes the qualification or makes it curable. 
Curable qualifications also come in two types. The first type are qualifications 
that may be “cured” at some point during the term of elected office. For instance, 
someone who is not twenty-five years old, but will turn twenty-five within the next 
two years, could have the qualification cured before the end of the House term. The 
House, for example, has refused to seat a member until he reached twenty-five years 
of age, but has also refused to declare the seat vacant.95 The second type are 
qualifications that may not be cured at some point during the term of elected office. 
A twenty-seven-year-old running for President, for example, would not turn 
thirty-five during that four-year term. 
These classifications matter because Congress has treated unqualified candidates 
differently when these candidates win elections.96 And how Congress treats 
qualifications is not necessarily how states might treat qualifications—or how courts 
might decide whether or not a candidate meets constitutional qualifications in the 
course of litigation, the subject of the next Part. 
II. LITIGATION ABOUT QUALIFICATIONS 
There has been some litigation over whether candidates the state excluded from 
the ballot because the state found them not qualified were improperly left off,97 or 
whether candidates scheduled to appear on a state ballot actually met the qualifications 
enumerated in the Constitution.98 And the judiciary, quite often, has refused to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 94. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 25 (1968) (invalidating a state law that made 
it “virtually impossible” for parties other than the Democratic and Republican parties to obtain 
ballot access for their presidential candidates in violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 95. See infra notes 177–81 and accompanying text. 
 96. See infra notes 173–98 and accompanying text (examining Congress’s treatment of 
potentially unqualified candidates). 
 97. See infra Part II.A. 
 98. See infra Part II.B. 
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adjudicate the merits of those disputes.99 The examination below demonstrates that 
the bulk of the disputes have arisen in the context of presidential elections, that they 
are of fairly recent vintage, and that courts have approached the question differently 
than Congress’s treatment of the Constitution’s enumerated qualifications. 
A. Qualifications Litigation After the State Has Excluded a Candidate 
First, there are instances when the state has refused to list a candidate on the ballot, 
and the candidate subsequently challenged that refusal. 
William Higgs, 1968. The People’s Constitutional Party nominated William 
Higgs to run for the House of Representatives in a district in New Mexico in 1968.100 
He had “recently” moved to New Mexico, but the Secretary of State had excluded 
him from the ballot for failing to meet the constitutional qualification of 
inhabitancy.101 The Supreme Court of New Mexico ultimately found that whether he 
was a “‘sojourner’ so as to disqualify him from holding the office, if elected, [was] 
not for [them] to decide.”102 It was a matter left to Congress, and Mr. Higgs should 
have been certified to appear on the ballot.103 
Eldridge Cleaver, 1968. The Peace and Freedom Party nominated 
thirty-three-year-old Eldridge Cleaver for president in 1968.104 New York refused to list 
the party on the ballot because the electors could not be listed without also listing 
presidential and vice presidential candidates.105 California refused to list him because he 
was ineligible, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari.106 
Linda Jenness and Andrew Pulley, 1972. Illinois rejected listing Linda Jenness of 
the Socialist Workers Party as a candidate for President in 1972.107 Ms. Jenness 
refused to take a loyalty oath mandated by state law, but the state electoral board also 
informed her that because she was thirty-one years of age, she would not be listed on 
the ballot.108 A federal court struck down the loyalty oath as unconstitutional.109 
Nevertheless, the court found that an “affirmation of citizenship of the United States” 
                                                                                                                 
 
 99. See, e.g., infra notes 100–03 and accompanying text (noting courts’ deference to 
judgment of Congress concerning qualifications of a congressional candidate); infra notes 
132–36 and accompanying text (highlighting most courts’ conclusions that claims concerning 
eligibility of Messrs. McCain and Obama were not justiciable). 
 100. State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 446 P.2d 445, 448 (N.M. 1968). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 449–50.  
 104. In re Garst, 294 N.Y.S.2d 33, 34 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d sub nom. Garst v. Lomenzo, 294 
N.Y.S.2d 990 (App. Div.), aff’d, 242 N.E.2d 482 (N.Y. 1968). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Cleaver v. Jordan, 393 U.S. 810 (1968), as discussed in Keyes v. Bowen, 117 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 207, 215 (Ct. App. 2010). Despite this, the slate of electors for the Peace and Freedom 
Party still appeared on the ballot and garnered over 27,000 votes. See PETERSEN, supra note 
66, at tbl.135. 
 107. Socialist Workers Party of Illinois v. Ogilvie, 357 F. Supp. 109, 112 (N.D. Ill. 1972) 
(per curiam). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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was constitutionally valid, and that denying ballot access because of her age 
“violate[d] no federal right.”110 
Abdul Hassan, 2012. Abdul Hassan was a naturalized citizen of the United States 
who sought ballot access to run for President in 2012. In one federal proceeding, he 
sought a declaration that he was eligible to run for President.111 His argument turned 
on a theory that, among other things, the Fourteenth Amendment implicitly repealed 
the Natural Born Citizen Clause.112 That court found that the claims were ripe for 
review but that Mr. Hassan was not eligible, dismissing the complaint.113 Federal 
courts found that refusals in Iowa,114 Montana,115 New Hampshire,116 and 
Colorado117 to put Mr. Hassan on the ballot for his failure to affirm that he met the 
constitutional requirements were constitutional. 
Peta Lindsay, 2012. The California Secretary of State refused to list Peta Lindsay 
of the Peace and Freedom Party as a presidential candidate on the 2012 primary ballot 
because she was twenty-seven years old; a federal court upheld the refusal.118 
B. Qualifications Litigation After the State Has Included a Candidate 
The second category of cases includes those in which the state has listed a 
candidate on the ballot and a litigant sues to exclude the candidate from the ballot for 
lack of qualifications. The litigants may be taxpayers or voters, who often lack 
standing. When candidates running against the allegedly unqualified candidate sue, 
they fare better in terms of standing but still tend to lose on the merits.119 
                                                                                                                 
 
 110. Id. at 113; cf. John Copeland Nagle, Essay, A Twentieth Amendment Parable, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 470, 470 n.1 (1997) (noting that the court found that keeping an underage 
candidate off the ballot did not violate the 20th Amendment). In related litigation, the Federal 
Communications Commission found that Ms. Jenness and Mr. Pulley were not entitled to 
“equal time” on network television under Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 
because they were not legally qualified candidates. In re Complaint by Socialist Worker Party 
1972, New York, N.Y., 39 F.C.C.2d 89, 92–93 (1972). 
 111. Hassan v. United States, No. 08-CV-0938 (NG), 2010 WL 9493338, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. 
June 15, 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 441 F. App’x 10 (2d Cir. 2011) (concluding plaintiff 
lacked standing); accord Hassan v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 893 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 112. Hassan, 2010 WL 9493338, at *2. 
 113. Id. at *1, *3–4. 
 114. Hassan v. Iowa, CIVIL NO. 4-11-CV-00574, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188213, at *3–
20 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 26, 2012), aff’d, 493 F. App’x 813 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 115. Hassan v. Montana, No. CV-11-72-H-DWM-RKS, 2012 WL 8169887, at *1 (D. 
Mont. May 3, 2012), aff’d, 520 F. App’x 553 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 116. Hassan v. New Hampshire, Civil No. 11-cv-552-JD, 2012 WL 405620, at *4 (D.N.H. 
Feb. 8, 2012). 
 117. Hassan v. Colorado, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1201 (D. Colo.), aff’d, 495 F. App’x 947 
(10th Cir. 2012). 
 118. See Peace and Freedom Party v. Bowen, No. 2:12-cv-00853-GEB-EFB, 2012 WL 
1455248 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2012) (denying motion for preliminary injunction); Peace and 
Freedom Party v. Bowen, 912 F. Supp. 2d 905 (E.D. Cal. 2012); aff’d sub nom. Lindsay v. 
Bowen, 750 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 119. See, e.g., Barnett v. Obama, No. SACV 09-0082 DOC (ANx), 2009 WL 3861788, at 
*8–16 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2009) (finding presidential candidates as sole plaintiffs to have 
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But this kind of litigation is historically rare. This may in part be attributable to a 
rather laissez-faire attitude of election litigation until the twenty-first century.120 It 
may be that the parties or ballot-seeking nominees have rarely had contestable 
qualifications (which cannot explain all of it, as there is an extensive history of 
exclusions from Congress, and a nontrivial number of unqualified candidates listed 
on the ballot). It may be that even modest state regulations have channeled mostly 
qualified members to the ballot. Or it may be that unqualified, ballot-listed candidates 
do not generate litigation, as many of them are third-party candidates. Regardless, 
research found that this litigation was of recent vintage.121 
Dick Cheney, 2000. Governor George W. Bush named Dick Cheney as his vice 
presidential candidate in 2000.122 Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney both lived in Texas.123 
Mr. Cheney moved to Wyoming so that Texas electors could vote for both candidates 
under the Twelfth Amendment.124 After the election, voters sued to enjoin Texas 
electors from voting for both candidates. 125 A federal court dismissed the action for 
lack of standing but went on to conclude that Mr. Cheney was an “inhabitant” of 
Wyoming.126 Admittedly, the lawsuit arose after the Republican slate of electors had 
been selected, and there may have been the additional question as to whether the 
court even had the power to issue an injunction binding the future votes of the 
presidential electors.127 It was, nonetheless, a qualifications dispute. 
Jim McCrery, 2006. In a Louisiana congressional election in 2006, Jim McCrery 
defeated several candidates. After losing, one candidate sued and alleged that Mr. 
McCrery had sold his residence in Louisiana and no longer qualified as an 
“inhabitant.”128 Again, this case arose after the election, but a federal court rejected 
the claim as the matter was left to Congress.129 
Róger Calero, 2008. Róger Calero ran for President as the Socialist Workers Party 
candidate in 2004 and 2008.130 It appears there was just one case litigating Calero’s 
appearance on the ballot, in New York in 2008, and the state court there rejected the 
claims and permitted him to appear on the ballot.131 
                                                                                                                 
 
suffered an injury in fact for purposes of Article III); see generally infra notes 133–36 
(identifying cases, many of which were dismissed on justiciability grounds). 
 120. See Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 89–91 (2009) 
(assessing increase in election-related litigation). 
 121. See id. 
 122. Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713, 715 (N.D. Tex. 2000). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 720. 
 125. Id. at 715. 
 126. Id. at 720. 
 127. See id. at 718 n.9 (assuming arguendo that the plaintiffs met the requirements for 
obtaining injunctive relief). 
 128. Cox v. McCrery, No. Civ.A.06-2191, 2007 WL 97142, at *1 (W.D. La. Jan. 5, 2007). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Strunk v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 950 N.Y.S.2d 722, 2012 WL 1205117 (Sup. 
Ct. 2012). 
 131. Id. at *2 (finding that plaintiff lacked standing, that plaintiff failed to state a claim, 
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that plaintiff was precluded due to action 
filed in Strunk v. Paterson, Index No. 29642/08). 
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John McCain, 2008. John McCain was born to citizen parents in the Panama 
Canal Zone in 1936.132 When he ran for President in 2008, some challenged that he 
was not a natural born citizen, but courts uniformly rejected any challenges to his 
appearance on the ballot.133 
Barack Obama, 2008 & 2012. Barack Obama was born in Hawaii in 1961, though 
his father was Kenyan, which prompted various concerns and conspiracy theories.134 
Some suggested that Mr. Obama held Kenyan or Indonesian citizenship at some 
point in his life, which meant he was not a natural born citizen; others contended that 
he was actually born in either Kenya or Indonesia, and that copies of his birth 
certificate or other information to the contrary were forged.135 Courts uniformly have 
rejected challenges to these “birther” suits, both preelection and postelection, in his 
2008 and 2012 presidential bids.136 
                                                                                                                 
 
 132. Resolution Recognizing that John Sidney McCain, III, Is a Natural Born Citizen, 
S. Res. 511, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted). 
 133. See, e.g., Stamper v. United States, No. 1:08 CV 2593, 2008 WL 4838073 (N.D. Ohio 
Nov. 4, 2008) (finding that plaintiff lacked standing); Robinson v. Bowen, 567 F. Supp. 2d 
1144 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that plaintiff lacked standing, that matter was left to Congress 
and electors in the first instance, and that it was “highly probable” that he was a natural born 
citizen); Hollander v. McCain, 566 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.N.H. 2008) (standing); Strunk, 2012 WL 
1205117, at *2 (finding that plaintiff lacked standing, that plaintiff failed to state a claim, that 
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that plaintiff was precluded due to action filed 
in Strunk v. Paterson, Index No. 29642/08). 
 134. See, e.g., Berg v. Obama 574 F. Supp. 2d 509, 513 (E.D. Pa. 2008), aff’d, 586 F.3d 
234 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing plaintiff’s allegations that “Obama is either a citizen of his father’s 
native Kenya, by birth there or through operation of U.S. law; or that Obama became a citizen 
of Indonesia by relinquishing his prior citizenship (American or Kenyan) when he moved there 
with his mother in 1967”). 
 135. See id. 
 136. Kerchner v. Obama, 612 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2010) (dismissing suit for lack of standing); 
Berg v. Obama, 586 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2009) (dismissing suit for lack of standing); Grinols v. 
Electoral Coll., No. 12-cv-02997-MCE-DAD, 2013 WL 211135 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2013) 
(rejecting as a political question; most plaintiffs lacked standing, and the issue was moot and 
barred by the Speech or Debate Clause); Liberty Legal Found. v. Nat’l Democratic Party of 
the USA, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 791 (W.D. Tenn. 2012) (dismissing suit for lack of standing); 
Taitz v. Obama, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (rejecting writ of quo warranto for lack of 
standing); Barnett v. Obama, No. SACV 09-0082 DOC (ANx), 2009 WL 3861788 (C.D. Cal. 
Oct. 29, 2009) (finding that plaintiffs generally lacked standing), aff’d sub nom. Drake v. 
Obama, 664 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissing suit for lack of standing); Cook v. Good, 
No. 4:09-cv-82 (CDL), 2009 WL 2163535 (M.D. Ga. July 16, 2009) (standing); Hollister v. 
Soetoro, 601 F. Supp. 2d 179 (D.D.C. 2009) (dismissing as interpleader was an inappropriate 
form of action), aff’d, 368 F. App’x 154 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Cohen v. Obama, Civil 
Action No. 08 2150, 2008 WL 5191864 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2008) (dismissing suit for lack of 
standing); Stamper, 2008 WL 4838073 (dismissing suit for lack of standing); McInnish v. 
Bennett, CV-12-1053, 2014 WL 1098246 (Ala. Mar. 21, 2014) (per curiam) (rejecting 
plaintiffs’ claim with no opinion); Lamb v. Obama, No. S-15155, 2014 WL 1016308 (Alaska 
Mar. 12, 2014) (finding plaintiff lacked standing and lacked legally cognizable claim); Keyes 
v. Bowen, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 207 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the state had no duty to 
investigate qualifications); Wrotnowski v. Bysiewicz, 958 A.2d 709 (Conn. 2008) (finding no 
statutory standing); Ankeny v. Governor of Ind., 916 N.E.2d 678 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (finding 
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C. Lessons from Litigation 
The majority of decisions in qualifications litigation do not reach the merits and 
fail to examine whether a candidate is actually qualified. Federal courts have often 
found Article III standing as a barrier to justiciability.137 Indeed, the overwhelming 
number of cases litigated in federal court during the 2008 election regarding Mr. 
Obama and Mr. McCain were dismissed for lack of standing.138 Plaintiffs were 
usually voters who lacked an “injury in fact,”139 because the harm allegedly suffered 
was essentially shared by all voting citizens.140 Third-party candidates acting as 
plaintiffs fared somewhat better in surviving standing and having the case decided 
on other grounds.141 
                                                                                                                 
 
Mr. Obama a “natural-born citizen” who was born within the borders of the United States); 
Strunk, 2012 WL 1205117, at *2 (finding plaintiff lacked standing, plaintiff failed to state a 
claim, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and plaintiff was precluded due to action 
filed in Strunk v. Paterson, Index No. 29642/08); Greenberg v. Brunner, No. 2008-CV-1024 
(Wood Cnty. Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 14, 2009); Neal v. Brunner, No. 08CV72726 (Warren 
Cnty. Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 17, 2008); Paige v. State, 88 A.3d 1182 (Vt. 2013) (finding 
plaintiff’s claim moot); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Donofrio v. Wells, 129 S. Ct. 752 
(2008) (No. 08-A407), 2008 WL 5195863. This chronicle excludes other “birther”-related 
litigation, such as denying that a soldier is obligated to heed the orders of an ineligible 
president. Sibley v. Alexander, 916 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2013) (dismissing suit based on 
standing and mootness); Reade v. Galvin, No. 12-11492-DJC, 2012 WL 5385683 (D. Mass. 
Oct. 30, 2012) (finding lack of standing and finding no duty for state to investigate challenges 
to qualifications); Sibley v. Obama, 866 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding lack of 
jurisdiction); Tisdale v. Obama, No. 3:12-CV-00036-JAG, 2012 WL 7856823 (E.D. Va. Jan. 
23, 2012) (finding a failure to state a claim because Mr. Obama was born in the United States; 
plaintiff also alleged that Mr. Romney and Ron Paul were ineligible because they had at least 
one noncitizen parent, and the court rejected these claims on the same basis), aff’d, 473 F. 
App’x 203 (4th Cir. 2012); Rhodes v. MacDonald, No. 4:09-CV-106 (CDL), 2009 WL 
2997605 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 16, 2009); Wolf v. Fuddy, 301 P.3d 1268 (Haw. Ct. App. 2013) 
(finding plaintiff lacked standing to request Mr. Obama’s birth certificate to investigate the 
candidate’s eligibility); Jordan v. Reed, No. 12-2-01763-5, 2012 WL 4739216 (Wash. Super. 
Ct. Aug. 29, 2012) (dismissing for failure to join indispensable party, lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, and lack of statutory authority for secretary to investigate); Plaintiff’s Reply to 
Defendant Obama’s Memorandum of Law of June 15, 2012 in Support of His Motion to 
Dismiss and Plaintiff’s Second Supplemental Memorandum, Voeltz v. Obama, No. 2012-CA
-00467, 2012 WL 2524874 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 29, 2012), 2012 WL 3195521.  
 137. See generally Tokaji, supra note 8 (describing justiciability barriers to federal 
adjudication of qualifications). 
 138. See supra notes 133, 136 (compiling cases and noting that most were dismissed on 
justiciability grounds). 
 139. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (defining injury in fact). 
 140. See Tokaji, supra note 8, at 33. 
 141. See, e.g., Barnett v. Obama, No. SACV 09-0082 DOC (ANx), 2009 WL 3861788, at 
*8–10, *16 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2009) (finding that candidates for President and Vice President 
could potentially satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement, but ruling that plaintiffs lacked 
standing on redressability grounds), aff’d sub nom. Drake v. Obama, 664 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 
2011); cf. Fulani v. Hogsett, 917 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1990) (concluding that a candidate could 
challenge certification of other candidates). 
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State judiciaries, in contrast, have general jurisdiction and are not bound by the 
Article III jurisdictional requirement, even when they adjudicate questions of federal 
law.142 Indeed, some states have eschewed an examination of justiciability altogether 
and addressed the merits of the claim.143 
These disputes, at their core, are the consequences of an assumption. Courts 
assume that it is within the power of the state government to adjudicate the 
qualifications of a federal candidate in the first place, and, subsequently, to exclude 
an unqualified candidate, to include a qualified candidate, or even to include an 
unqualified candidate. However, courts have not openly addressed this assumption. 
There have been instances where courts come close to examining whether state 
governments have the power to evaluate qualifications, but they usually skirt just 
outside the subject. For instance, a New York state court concluded that the 
determination of the qualifications of presidential candidates was a nonjusticiable 
political question.144 It was not an examination of whether the state government had 
the power to evaluate qualifications; it simply disclaimed any role of the state 
judiciary. However, that hardly addresses the question as to whether state legislatures 
and executives ought to engage in the matter.145 
Additionally, a California state court concluded that the Secretary of State had no 
affirmative duty to examine the qualifications of presidential candidates.146 Even if 
the state statutory authority did not demand a “ministerial duty to investigate” 
constitutional eligibility of candidates,147 it still did not address whether there was 
the constitutional authority to do so. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 142. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART 
& WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 138 (5th ed. 2003). 
 143. See, e.g., Keyes v. Bowen, 117 Cal. Rep. 3d 207 (Ct. App. 2010) (undertaking no 
justiciability analysis where at least one plaintiff was not a candidate or presidential elector, 
and solely addressing demurrer on the merits); Ankeny v. Governor of Ind., 916 N.E.2d 678 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (undertaking no justiciability analysis, and solely addressing motion to 
dismiss on the merits). 
 144. Strunk v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 950 N.Y.S.2d 722, 2012 WL 1205117, at *11–12 
(Sup. Ct. Apr. 11, 2012). Of note, the “political question doctrine” is a function of “separation of 
powers,” see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962), which is generally a definition of power 
within the three branches of the federal government and of the role of the federal judiciary, see 
FALLON ET AL., supra note 142. But this state court felt compelled to view itself as bound by the 
same principle as the federal courts, without explanation. 
 145. But see Strunk, 2012 WL 1205117, at *12 (“[The Electoral Count Act] is the exclusive 
means to resolve objections to the electors’ selection of a President or a Vice President, 
including objections raised by plaintiff Strunk. Federal courts have no role in this process. 
Plainly, state courts have no role. . . . If a state court were to involve itself in the eligibility of 
a candidate to hold the office of President, a determination reserved for the Electoral College 
and Congress, it may involve itself in national political matters for which it is institutionally 
ill-suited and interfere with the constitutional authority of the Electoral College and 
Congress.”); but cf. Robinson v. Bowen, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“[T]he 
challenge presented by plaintiff is committed under the Constitution to the electors and the 
legislative branch, at least in the first instance.”). 
 146. Keyes, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 213–14. 
 147. See id. at 215. 
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Finally, these cases are slightly different from instances in which a candidate 
wishes to withdraw from the ballot and claims that his ineligibility under the 
Qualifications Clause is a basis for removal. The deference to the candidate’s desire 
to withdraw has varied after the candidate claims ineligibility.148 
Ultimately, these cases teach us relatively little about the power of the states in 
adjudicating the qualifications necessary to hold office. Judiciaries tend to be 
hands-off when it comes to disputes involving congressional candidates and 
Republican or Democratic presidential candidates. They are more inclined to allow 
state officials the discretion to include or exclude third-party presidential candidates 
from the ballot. But this deference to state lawmakers lacks a theoretical 
underpinning, to which this Article now turns. 
III. THE POWER TO ADJUDICATE QUALIFICATIONS 
The Constitution, then, enumerates qualifications for federal office.149 The 
judiciary has examined instances where a state actor has included or excluded a 
candidate from the ballot and litigation ensues, but the litigation has largely focused 
either on justiciability or on the merits—not on the power of the state actor to make 
that determination.150 
The next question is: Which authority has the power to evaluate whether a candidate 
meets those qualifications? After all, by the time the courts are involved in litigation, it 
is usually at a point in the process where some other election official has already acted 
(or is about to act), and a litigant is asking for the court to direct the election official to 
behave differently. Who the decision makers are, and what power they have, are the 
questions that must be answered prior to a judicial directive. 
A. The Power of Voters To Scrutinize Qualifications 
As originally conceived, electors would vote for President, state legislatures 
would vote for Senators, and the people would vote for members of the House of 
Representatives. The Seventeenth Amendment changed a portion of this process, 
allowing the people to vote for Senators as they vote for members of the House of 
Representatives.151 
The Constitution does not adopt a specific political theory about how those voters 
ought to behave; rather, it is an essentially plenary authority for voters to decide how 
to vote on whatever basis they want, unchecked by the judiciary.152 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. Compare Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
congressional candidate would remain on ballot despite moving out of state because statute 
permitting removal of candidate amounted to pre–election day residency requirement), with 
Kryzan v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 865 N.Y.S.2d 793 (App. Div. 2008) (holding that 
congressional candidate who moved out of state and was disqualified could petition elections 
board for another candidate to appear on the ballot). 
 149. See supra Part I. 
 150. See supra Part II. 
 151. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof . . . .”). 
 152. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. 
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Thus, a voter may consider the constitutional qualifications of a candidate.153 
Voters, of course, can be wrong. Voters could wrongly refuse to vote for a 
candidate because they believe he is not a natural born citizen, or not old enough, or 
not an inhabitant, even if he is. But just as a voter may vote for or against someone 
on a view unrelated to constitutional qualifications—for instance, on the basis of that 
candidate’s race or religion—there is little to prevent the voter from exercising her 
right in whatever way she sees fit. 
There is one slight exception. Many state legislatures have cabined the discretion 
of presidential electors in recent history: some provide a fine or make it a crime to 
vote for a candidate other than the one pledged; others require oaths and call for 
resignation from office if an elector casts a “faithless” vote.154 
These pledges are something more than the kind that the Supreme Court upheld 
in Ray v. Blair, which were pledges placed upon electors by the nominating political 
party and which directed electors to cast ballots in accordance with the directives of 
the party.155 While a state might add permissible qualifications to the office of 
elector,156 the constitutionality of binding presidential electors in this fashion is a 
matter of some dispute.157 Putting this matter aside, it is as least useful to identify 
this trend before discussing the power of states to independently examine the 
qualifications of candidates.158 
                                                                                                                 
 
L. REV. 63, 94 (1990) (“[T]he electorate votes its subjective preferences.”); Jim Rutenberg, 
Mormons’ First Families Rally Behind Romney, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2012, at A1 (“I think for 
Mormons, particularly for prominent ones who already feel widely accepted and admired 
individually, this feels like a chance to also see their church, which they love, accepted and 
admired institutionally.”); Samuel L. Jackson Says, “I Voted for Barack Obama Because He 
Was Black!”, EBONY (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.ebony.com/black-listed/entertainment
-culture/samuel-l-jackson-says-i-voted-for-barack-obama-because-he-was-black (Samuel L. 
Jackson explained, “I voted for Barack because he was black. ‘Cuz that’s why other folks vote 
for other people—because they look like them.”). 
 153. Cf. Keyes v. Bowen, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 207, 213 (Ct. App. 2010) (“There is no 
obligation that the Electors first determine whether the presidential candidate is eligible for 
office. Similarly, the California Elections Code does not impose on the Electors any obligation 
to determine a presidential candidate’s eligibility.”). 
 154. Robert W. Bennett, The Problem of the Faithless Elector: Trouble Aplenty Brewing 
Just Below the Surface in Choosing the President, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 121, 121–22 (2006). 
 155. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952). 
 156. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text. 
 157. See TARA ROSS, ENLIGHTENED DEMOCRACY: THE CASE FOR THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 
113 (2d ed. 2012) (examining uncertainty surrounding loyalty oaths and pledges); Akhil Reed 
Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing the Constitution’s Succession Gap, 48 
ARK. L. REV. 215, 219 (1995) (calling “the constitutionality of such laws . . . highly dubious 
if we consult constitutional text, history, and structure”); Beverly J. Ross & William 
Josephson, The Electoral College and the Popular Vote, 12 J.L. & POL. 665, 696 (1996) 
(concluding that “the Court’s language and reasoning in Ray v. Blair strongly imply that state 
laws directly binding electors to a specific candidate are constitutional”); cf. Ray, 343 U.S. at 
230 (finding that a political party’s pledge for presidential electors was constitutional but 
reserving judgment as to whether the promises were “legally unenforceable because violative 
of an assumed constitutional freedom of the elector under the Constitution, Art. II, § 1, to vote 
as he may choose in the electoral college”). 
 158. See infra Part IV. 
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B. The Power of Congress To Scrutinize Qualifications 
Voters have the power to exercise unfettered discretion to decide for whom to 
vote, including the power to evaluate the qualifications of a candidate. What power 
does Congress have? 
As a preliminary matter, the Constitution treats Congress’s evaluation of 
executive and legislative qualifications quite differently. There is a “textually 
demonstrable commitment”159 to Congress to evaluate the qualifications of its own 
members; there is no such express commitment for its handling of presidential 
candidates.160 Federalism further complicates the issue, as the division between 
federal and state power over elections, while important,161 is often less than clear.162 
Congress’s authority in each instance—congressional elections and presidential 
elections—is considered in turn. 
1. Congress’s Power in Congressional Elections 
A pair of straightforward principles arises from the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Qualifications Clauses for congressional members. First, 
Congress may not refuse to seat a duly elected candidate who meets all federal 
constitutional qualifications for office.163 Second, the qualifications enumerated in 
the Constitution are exhaustive, and states cannot add to them.164 
The Constitution gives a robust role to Congress in its power to determine the 
qualifications of members of Congress. Article I provides, “Each House shall be the 
Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members . . . .”165 Courts 
have interpreted this provision to be a power vested exclusively in the legislature.166 
                                                                                                                 
 
 159. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548 (1969) (“Art. I, § 5, is at most a ‘textually 
demonstrable commitment’ to Congress to judge only the qualifications expressly set forth in the 
Constitution.”); see also Franita Tolson, The Union as a Safeguard Against Faction: Congressional 
Gridlock as State Empowerment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2267, 2273–74 (2013). 
 160. See infra Parts IV.C, IV.D. But see supra note 145 (state court finding political 
question doctrine applicable to presidential elections). 
 161. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 410 (1819) (“They are each sovereign, 
with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects 
committed to the other.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 162. See, e.g., Derek T. Muller, The Play in the Joints of the Election Clauses, 13 ELECTION L.J. 
310 (2014); Franita Tolson, Benign Partisanship, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 395, 405–07 (2012). 
 163. Powell, 395 U.S. at 522. 
 164. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
 166. See, e.g., Sevilla v. Elizalde, 112 F.2d 29, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (“Apparently it has 
been fully recognized that that power is lodged exclusively in the legislative branch. Under 
parallel provisions in state constitutions giving state legislatures the power to determine the 
qualifications of their members, it is ruled that the legislative power is exclusive—that the 
courts have no jurisdiction.”); Application of James, 241 F. Supp. 858, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) 
(“Accordingly, the federal courts have no jurisdiction to pass on the qualifications and the 
legality of the election of any member of the House of Representatives.”); Keogh v. Horner, 
8 F. Supp. 933, 935 (S.D. Ill. 1934) (“[T]he power of the respective Houses of Congress with 
reference to the qualifications and legality of the election of its members is supreme.”). Unlike 
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The Founders endorsed a strong role for the legislature in evaluating the 
qualifications of its own members, stretching back before the American founding.167 
In In re Gadsden, a dispute in South Carolina in 1762, a Representative to the House 
of Commons, whose election was administered by a warden of the church, apparently 
had not been properly sworn.168 The South Carolina House of Commons declared 
him elected, but the Governor refused to administer the oath of office.169 The 
legislature was in “sharp dispute” with the Governor, noting that “the right to 
determine the validity of elections for seats in the legislature ‘belonged “SOLELY” 
and “ABSOLUTELY” to the representatives of the people.’”170 The people had 
elected a candidate, and it was left to the peoples’ representatives—that is, the House 
of Commons—to decide whether to seat him, and not left to another official—in this 
case, a Governor appointed by the Crown. 
The Founders agreed with this understanding of the scope of legislative authority. 
The Constitution ensured that the federal legislature would hold the power to 
examine the qualifications of its own members.171 And Congress has regularly used 
its power to judge the qualification of its members, as its decisions regarding 
unqualified or heavily disputed members are instructive.172 
Citizen. In 1794, after Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania had been sworn in as a 
Senator, the Senate voted that his election was void and removed him from office.173 
He had been in the United States since 1780, but he was unable to establish that he 
had been a citizen for at least nine years.174 The same happened to James Shields of 
Illinois in 1849.175 After he had been seated, the Senate found that he had not been a 
                                                                                                                 
 
the Impeachment Clauses, however, the Qualifications Clauses do not include the word “sole” 
in assigning responsibility to Congress, which may weigh against a finding that the matter is 
a political question. Cf. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (finding a textually 
demonstrable commitment to the Senate to try all impeachments because the Constitution 
grants it the “sole Power” to do so). 
 167. For an excellent, detailed background on the history of legislative discretion over the 
elections and seating of its members, see JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW 51–
61, 162–92 (2007); see also Paul E. Salamanca & James E. Keller, The Legislative Privilege 
to Judge the Qualifications, Elections, and Returns of Members, 95 KY. L.J. 241, 326–33 
(2006) (relating the British Parliament’s attempts to exclude John Wilkes from his elected seat 
at Parliament and how this affair affected the establishment of the American rules for 
determining qualifications for the legislature after the Revolutionary War). 
 168. See Salamanca & Keller, supra note 167, at 271. 
 169. Id. at 272. 
 170. Id. (quoting JACK P. GREENE, THE QUEST FOR POWER: THE LOWER HOUSES OF 
ASSEMBLY IN THE SOUTHERN ROYAL COLONIES, 1689–1776, at 193 (1963)). 
 171. See supra notes 167–70 and accompanying text. 
 172. But perhaps its decisions to seat members after an investigation into their 
qualifications are just as instructive. See, e.g., Salamanca & Keller, supra note 167, at 283–95 
(chronicling notable disputes when Congress ultimately seated the member). The chronicle of 
all incidents can be found generally in HINDS’ PRECEDENTS. 
 173. HINDS’ PRECEDENTS, supra note 19, § 428; see also CHAFETZ, supra note 167, at 179. 
 174. HINDS’ PRECEDENTS, supra note 19, § 428; see also Salamanca & Keller, supra note 
167, at 282–83. 
 175. HINDS’ PRECEDENTS, supra note 19, § 429. 
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citizen of the United States for long enough.176 
Age. In 1859, John Young Brown of Kentucky had a certificate of election and 
appeared on the list of members-elect of the House of Representatives.177 He was not 
sworn in until December 3, 1860, because he was not twenty-five years old until that 
time.178 The same occurred with Rush D. Holt, elected to the Senate from West 
Virginia in 1934.179 He was twenty-nine years old and did not present himself to the 
Senate until June 19, 1935, when he turned thirty.180 The Senate seated him, 
concluding that age and citizenship “need not be satisfied until an elected Member 
of Congress presents himself to take the oath.”181 
Inhabitant. In 1824, the people of Massachusetts elected John Bailey to the House of 
Representatives.182 The House, however, determined that Bailey had resided in the 
District of Columbia for several years and did not qualify as an “inhabitant” of 
Massachusetts at the time he was elected.183 The House similarly rejected Jennings Pigott 
in 1863 for being a mere “sojourner” instead of an “inhabitant” of North Carolina.184 
Holder of another office. John Van Ness of New York was appointed major in the 
militia in the District of Columbia while serving in the House.185 In 1803, Congress 
unanimously excluded him from Congress.186 This precedent prompted a practice among 
later Representatives, who would resign upon acceptance of an incompatible office.187 
Insurrectionist. In 1870, the North Carolina legislature elected former 
Confederacy-era Governor Zebulon B. Vance as Senator.188 He was an avowed 
insurrectionist, however, and his allegiance to the Confederacy ran afoul of Section 
3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.189 He resigned from the Senate when it appeared 
that Congress would not remove this disability, and Congress subsequently issued a 
report noting that he was not entitled to the office.190 
While the Supreme Court has acknowledged one potential ambiguity in the area 
of federal qualifications, that ambiguity—at least, to Congress, by its own practice—
may not exist. The Court in Powell noted three “qualifications” in Article I, Section 
2: age, citizenship, and inhabitancy.191 But it also explained that there are a number of 
other qualifications—or, perhaps more specifically, disqualifications—that may or 
may not fall under Congress’s power to determine qualifications under Article I, 
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Section 5.192 However, the Court has declined to address that question, as the issue has 
not been squarely presented,193 and Congress has excluded members or members-elect 
based on an examination of lack of qualifications other than these three.194 
Congress’s resolution of these disputes often resides “somewhere at the 
intersection of law and politics.”195 But Congress has developed its own internal rules 
governing how it adjudicates qualifications.196 And the timing of the disqualification 
matters: Congress has concluded that inhabitancy must attach at the time of the 
election, but that age and citizenship may be established after the election.197 And the 
timing of presentment matters: winning candidates may withhold presentment to 
Congress until they have met a qualification.198 The practices of Congress influence 
later behavior, as candidates behave based upon how Congress has interpreted 
qualifications in earlier disputes. In sum, Congress’s exercise of power in this area 
has been broad and vigorous, and largely upheld by the Supreme Court when 
exercised within the confines of evaluating actual constitutional qualifications. 
2. Congress’s Power in Presidential Elections 
Congress’s power to evaluate presidential candidates is more complicated and 
uncertain. Congress isn’t evaluating the electoral choices of the people, as it does for 
its own members; it is instead evaluating the electoral choices of presidential electors. 
In the very first presidential election, the manner of the selection of presidential electors 
varied.199 That is, in 1789, some states held popular election for presidential electors, 
others selected them by the legislature, and still others used a hybrid.200 The electors 
subsequently voted for a President and a Vice President.201 
But quis custodiet ipsos custodes?202 Who evaluates whether the electors’ 
candidates meet the constitutional qualifications for office? The electors, after all, 
have no inherent obligation to examine the qualifications for the candidates they 
elect. They have an unfettered freedom similar to those of voters in general.203 The 
Oath or Affirmation Clause, which requires Senators, Representatives, members of state 
legislatures, and executive and judicial officers to pledge “by Oath or Affirmation, to 
support this Constitution,”204 likely does not apply to presidential electors.205 Originally, 
electors were not formally bound by any legal obligation to vote for a particular 
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candidate; they were selected by states, whether by the legislatures or by popular vote, 
and they voted independently for presidential candidates.206 
So, who would evaluate their selection? Perhaps they would evaluate themselves 
absent any independent review. Or perhaps one would conclude it is Congress’s 
responsibility to evaluate the credentials of presidential electors, lest there reside no 
other opportunity for review. 
The Constitution authorizes electors to cast votes for the President and Vice 
President.207 Congress’s role appears to be limited to the counting of votes: “[T]he 
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of 
Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted; — The 
person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the 
President . . . .”208 But Congress has addressed the scope of its power in two 
significant historical incidents—a debate in 1800 and the counting of electoral votes 
in 1872—and in ensuing legislation.209 
On January 29, 1800, Senator James Ross of Pennsylvania proposed a committee 
to “consider whether any, and what, provisions ought to be made by law for deciding 
disputed elections of President and Vice President of the United States, and for 
determining the legality or illegality of the votes given for those officers in the 
different States.”210 The floor erupted, reflecting two divided views.211 
The first view was that Congress had no power in this area. John Brown of 
Kentucky noted that “Congress had no right to legislate” in this area absent 
constitutional amendment.212 Abraham Baldwin of Georgia had a similar view and 
expounded upon it in great detail.213 
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina emphasized that the “whole direction as to 
the manner of [presidential electors’] appointment is given to the State 
Legislatures.”214 In his view, “Congress had no right to meddle with it at all,” as the 
Constitution took the election of the President “as far as possible” out of the hands 
of Congress.215 He opposed even a constitutional amendment to that effect.216 
The second view was that Congress must have that power because it must reside 
somewhere. Mr. Ross asked what might happen if presidential electors “should vote 
for a person to be President who had not the age required by the Constitution, or who 
had not been long enough a citizen of the United States . . . such cases might happen 
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and were very likely to happen, and is there no remedy?”217 Samuel Livermore of 
New Hampshire agreed that if electors “violated and disregarded” the qualifications 
for President, it could not be the case that the Constitution found it “nobody’s 
business to interpose, and make provision to prevent it.”218 
Samuel Dexter of Massachusetts cited qualifications as a concern, too.219 He 
argued, “The proceedings in the election of a President may be defective in all these 
particulars, and can it be supposed that there is no way to correct them?”220 Citing 
the Necessary and Proper Clause,221 he viewed such a law as “necessary to carry into 
effect the power of appointing the President.”222 
Further consideration of the matter was postponed, but it does not appear that 
Congress ever seriously revisited the matter until necessity struck years later.223 
Presidential elections over the first half of the nineteenth century saw Congress 
continue to count electoral votes without a definitive conclusion about its ability to 
reject votes.224 
The presidential election of 1872 gave Congress the opportunity to evaluate the 
qualifications of a presidential candidate who received electoral votes. The popular vote 
on November 5, 1872, yielded a sound majority of electors pledged to the Republican 
ticket, Ulysses S. Grant and Henry Wilson.225 The Democratic ticket, Horace Greeley 
and Benjamin G. Brown, received just sixty-six of the 352 electors pledged.226 
But Mr. Greeley died on November 29, 1872.227 When the Electoral College met 
to vote, the electors pledged to Mr. Greeley cast votes in a variety of ways. Three 
electors in Georgia, however, voted for the late Mr. Greeley.228 When Congress 
counted the electoral vote on February 12, 1873, the House and the Senate each 
needed to decide whether to count the votes of the three electors from Georgia.229 
Representative George Frisbie Hoar of Massachusetts objected to counting the 
Greeley votes, as the deceased Greeley was not a “person” under the Qualifications 
Clause.230 Representative Nathaniel P. Banks of Massachusetts, in contrast, 
disclaimed any role of Congress in evaluating the qualifications of a presidential 
candidate, asserting that “we have no power to decide on the eligibility of any man 
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voted for for President.”231 The House narrowly refused to count the votes by a count 
of 101-99 (with forty not voting).232 Pursuant to the Twenty-Second Joint Rule, the 
votes were not counted.233 
The Senate twice rejected resolutions that would have counted the votes with 
some qualifying language that the role of Congress was ministerial, once by a vote 
of 32-30 (with eleven not voting),234 and another by a vote of 32-28 (with thirteen 
not voting),235 before ultimately voting, by a margin of 44-19 (with ten not voting), 
to count the three electoral votes from Georgia for Mr. Greeley.236 
Congress also had to consider that at least one Georgia elector voted for Charles 
L. Jenkins for President and Alfred H. Colquitt for Vice President—both Georgia 
inhabitants and a violation of the requirement that each elector vote for at least one 
candidate who is not an inhabitant of that elector’s state.237 But that objection was 
raised too late, and the merits were not addressed.238 
There was relatively little debate over these propositions—certainly nothing as 
robust as the debate that arose in 1800. But this “musty precedent”239 effectively 
established the power of Congress to evaluate the qualifications of presidential 
candidates. Congress exercised its independent discretion about qualifications and 
refused to count electors’ votes on that basis.240 
After the contested presidential election of 1876 between Samuel Tilden and 
Rutherford B. Hayes, Congress spent years debating legislation regarding the 
counting of electoral votes before eventually enacting the Electoral Count Act of 
1887.241 Among other things, the Act provides the exclusive mechanism for objecting 
to the counting of electoral votes.242 The constitutionality of the Act, and Congress’s 
power to evaluate presidential candidates, has been tacitly approved by the Supreme 
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Court243 and robustly read by lower courts,244 but not without dissent.245 Congress 
would continue to debate its proper role in evaluating electors in years to come.246 
Since then, the people have enacted the 20th Amendment, which, among other 
things, addresses presidential elections.247 The Amendment includes a mention of 
presidential qualifications and a potential source of congressional power:  
If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of President, the 
President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become 
President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed 
for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to 
qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a 
President shall have qualified . . . .”248  
The matter of who determines whether a President “shall have qualified” is, 
however, less than clear—whether such matter is left to the judiciary249 or to 
Congress. And it is possible that Congress’s power to count votes is ministerial, but 
its power to evaluate whether a President is “qualified” under the 20th Amendment 
is more robust. 
Congress’s power to review qualifications of presidential candidates may arise 
from the Counting Clause, the 20th Amendment, or some other source like the 
Commerce Clause250 or the Fourteenth Amendment.251 Commentators tend to have 
mixed views as to whether Congress has the power to refuse to count the electoral 
votes if ballots are cast for an ineligible candidate.252 But Congress has expressed no 
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hesitation. Indeed, Congress continues to view itself as the source of evaluating the 
qualifications of the President. When questions arose over whether Mr. McCain was 
a natural born citizen, for instance, the Senate unanimously passed a resolution 
expressing the sense of the Senate that “John Sidney McCain, III, is a ‘natural born 
Citizen’ under Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States.”253 At 
the very least, this measure passed by the Senate suggested that no sitting Senator 
would object to counting electoral votes cast for Mr. McCain.254 
C. The Power of States To Administer the Ballot 
Voters and electors can evaluate qualifications. Congress can examine 
qualifications of its own members and probably those of presidential candidates. For 
states, however, their roles of evaluation would look slightly different: it would occur 
through the context of ballot access. Qualified candidates would obtain ballot access, 
and unqualified candidates would be denied. But the state-administered ballot—and 
the state role in controlling ballot access—is of recent vintage. 
Originally, voting in England and the United States usually took place orally.255 
But early in the Unites States’ history, colonies introduced the written ballot.256 
Ballots were written, however, not by state governments, but by individual voters.257 
Strictly speaking, ballot access at the time was “completely open,”258 because it was 
left to the voters to decide what to include on a ballot. 
The first Australian ballot—a standard, government-administered ballot given to 
voters at the polls—arrived in the United States in Louisville, Kentucky, in 1888.259 
It successfully curbed ballot-box corruption in a city formerly notorious for it.260 But 
once a government decides to manage and author the ballots that voters will use, it 
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must also decide who appears on the ballot. Louisville, for instance, allowed 
candidates to be nominated by a petition and submit a twenty dollar filing fee to 
appear on the ballot.261 
There was a concern for this system—but not exactly a concern that the system 
would act as a barrier to ballot access.262 Instead, the concern was that the publicly 
administered Australian ballot would give voters too many choices: when proposed 
in Michigan, a newspaper claimed that “it would be too cumbersome for a voter to 
choose from two hundred candidates.”263 When Massachusetts introduced the system 
in 1889, the ballot saw “more and better candidates.”264 Previously, a candidate had to 
vie for the attention of the voter ex ante and lobby for voters to remember the name to 
write on a slip of paper. Or the candidate could preprint and circulate ballots with the 
candidate’s name. Now, simple administrative tasks, like a petitioning requirement or 
a filing fee, allow a name to appear on every ballot in the jurisdiction. 
Then there was a concern that these generous provisions were not sustainable. 
Opposition at Tammany Hall focused on “the wide powers of election officials, the 
gap between nominations and election day, and the use of an exclusive or official 
ballot containing all the candidates.”265 While the South Australian ballot required 
two signatures for a candidate to appear, and the British ballot ten, American 
jurisdictions quickly required tens of thousands of signatures to nominate a 
candidate.266 What had been a fairly open system became far less open. 
Ballot-access rules, then, were not originally concerned with the states’ ex ante 
approval of the qualifications of a candidate. They were primarily mechanisms to 
cure corruption and to ease administration. But since then, in the context of disputes 
over qualifications of candidates, ballot access has played an important role—
particularly the question of whether write-in opportunities are an adequate substitute 
for the state printing a candidate’s name on the ballot.267 
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As a preliminary matter, it is probably not possible to distinguish ballot access 
from counting votes of those who receive votes. The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
found that candidates who fail to have their names printed on the ballot do not have 
an adequate alternative in a write-in campaign.268 The fact that a state may still 
tabulate the votes of a write-in candidate is not enough to save a refusal to list the 
candidate on the ballot. 
This dispute arose directly in the context of qualifications. In U.S. Term Limits, 
the Supreme Court rejected the constitutionality of state-imposed term limits for 
members of Congress.269 Arkansas claimed that candidates were still eligible to be 
elected, but that they simply could not have their names printed on the ballot.270 The 
Court concluded that a write-in candidacy in this context was an “attempt to achieve 
a result that is forbidden by the Federal Constitution,”271 and that “an amendment 
with the avowed purpose and obvious effect of evading the requirements of the 
Qualifications Clauses by handicapping a class of candidates cannot stand.”272 The 
dissent disputed that the “intent” of the ballot-access rule had no bearing on the 
Qualifications Clause analysis.273 
But, fortunately, this element of the debate may be set aside, as the concerns in U.S. 
Term Limits are distinguishable from the present discussion. There, the dispute was 
over whether the additional requirements were “qualifications,” as they limited printed 
ballot access but authorized write-in candidacies.274 For purposes of this Article, 
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however, ballot access is restricted because the state itself has made an independent 
determination about the existing constitutional qualifications of a candidate. If the state 
has no independent role in evaluating qualifications, then the issue of ballot access on 
the basis of qualifications is moot. Or, if the state has an independent role in evaluating 
qualifications, then whether it excludes the candidate is irrelevant. 
IV. THE POWER OF STATES TO SCRUTINIZE QUALIFICATIONS 
Before this Article examines the power of states to evaluate the constitutional 
qualifications of federal candidates, it is useful to summarize the power of other 
actors discussed above. Voters (and presidential electors) have largely unfettered 
discretion to independently evaluate whether federal candidates meet the 
constitutional qualifications for office.275 Congress has an exclusive role in judging 
the qualifications of its own members;276 its power to evaluate the qualifications of 
presidential candidates is less clear, but practice suggests that it has at least some 
independent power to do so.277 And the states’ role in administering elections and 
regulating ballot access is fairly well established and broad.278 
This state power to administer elections, while broad, is not unlimited.279 The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that states “have no reserved powers 
with respect to the elections of a federal government.”280 States cannot “violate 
express constitutional commands,” such as by discriminating on the basis of race 
or sex in elections.281 
The inquiry, then, is whether a state has the power to regulate its ballot in such a 
way that it evaluates the qualifications of candidates for federal office. May a state 
make an inquiry and exclude candidates it deems unqualified? Must it make such an 
inquiry? May a state permit unqualified candidates to appear on the ballot? And if it 
can make an inquiry, how burdensome can that inquiry be, and what is the recourse 
for candidates? 
                                                                                                                 
 
 275. See supra Part III.A. 
 276. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 277. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 278. See supra Part III.C. 
 279. See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013). 
 280. Vicki C. Jackson, Cook v. Gralike: Easy Cases and Structural Reasoning, 2001 SUP. 
CT. REV. 299, 304 (2001) (citing Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2000); U.S. Term Limits, 
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 805; Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 280–81). 
 281. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (“Nor can it be thought that the power to 
select electors could be exercised in such a way as to violate express constitutional commands 
that specifically bar States from passing certain kinds of laws. Clearly, the Fifteenth and 
Nineteenth Amendments were intended to bar the Federal Government and the States from 
denying the right to vote on grounds of race and sex in presidential elections. And the 
Twenty-fourth Amendment clearly and literally bars any State from imposing a poll tax on the 
right to vote ‘for electors for President or Vice President.’ Obviously we must reject the notion 
that Art. II, § 1, gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such 
burdens are expressly prohibited in other constitutional provisions. We therefore hold that no 
State can pass a law regulating elections that violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s command 
that ‘No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.’”). 
2015] SCRUTINIZING FEDERAL ELECTORAL QUALIFICATIONS 593 
 
This Part structures the legal issues into four parts, answering each of the following 
questions. First, may a state include a congressional candidate on the ballot whom 
Congress may later conclude is not qualified? Second, may a state exclude a 
congressional candidate from the ballot because it concludes she is not qualified? 
Third, may a state include a presidential candidate on the ballot whom electors or 
Congress may later conclude is not qualified? Fourth, may a state exclude a presidential 
candidate from the ballot because it concludes he is not qualified? 
A. Whether a State May Include a Possibly Unqualified Candidate 
for a House of Congress on the Ballot 
Suppose a state took no action investigating the qualifications of a candidate and 
simply listed the candidate on the ballot. And suppose that Congress went on to 
conclude that that candidate was not qualified. There are numerous instances where 
this has occurred, primarily before the Australian ballot.282 Some even occurred when 
state legislatures elected Senators.283 
Suppose, continuing the hypothetical, that upon finding that the elected candidate 
was not qualified, Congress declared the seat vacant and informed the state to hold a 
new election. There was no electoral crisis, no demand that states only send 
prescreened qualified members to Congress. Instead, Congress took upon itself the 
responsibility to make an independent evaluation of the candidate’s qualifications and, 
if the candidate was not qualified, sent the matter back to the state for a new election. 
In the framework of whether states can, or must, scrutinize the qualifications of 
candidates for federal office, this situation is the most straightforward. A state’s 
failure to examine—or refusal to examine—the qualifications of a congressional 
candidate is wholly consistent with Congress’s role to evaluate the qualifications of 
its members. The state is under no affirmative constitutional obligation to 
independently investigate the qualifications of candidates, and it is under no obligation 
to enact a statute that mandates investigation of qualifications. The people—the 
voters—have the opportunity to vote for the candidate of their choice, and it is left to 
Congress to decide whether to seat the winning candidate. 
If a party, or a voter, or another candidate sues and wants to remove a purportedly 
unqualified candidate from the ballot that the state has included, the court’s answer 
is simple: The state has no constitutional duty to investigate the qualifications of 
candidates for Congress. And a court cannot, on its own, reach the conclusion that a 
candidate fails to meet constitutional qualifications without infringing upon the 
proper role of Congress.284 
                                                                                                                 
 
 282. Candidates who failed to meet federal qualifications have obtained ballot access in 
the modern era, too. Consider Róger Calero (a 2006 Senate candidate in New York). See N.Y. 
STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, US SENATE ELECTION RETURNS NOV. 7, 2006 (2006), available at 
http://www.elections.ny.gov/NYSBOE/elections/2006/general/2006_ussen.pdf. 
 283. See supra notes 173–176 and accompanying text. 
 284. If Congress determines erroneously that an elected official is or is not qualified—
perhaps even for purely political reasons—the nonjusticiability of a political question may be 
called into question. Cf. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 239 (1993) (White, J., 
concurring in the judgment); id. at 252 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). But this Article 
concludes that Congress holds the exclusive role to evaluate qualifications. See supra Part 
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Whether the court’s role differs before the election is a slightly more challenging 
issue. One could make the argument that Congress has no power to evaluate 
qualifications until after the candidate has been elected; that the power to evaluate 
qualifications before the election is not committed to any branch or party; and that it 
may well be within the purview of a court to independently examine qualifications. 
But there is no affirmative duty on the state to do so before the election. A state statute 
might allow the state to make that investigation and exclude a candidate, a subject 
this Article considers next; but if the state has made the determination not to exclude 
the candidate, then there is nothing in the Constitution to force a state to exclude the 
candidate from the ballot. 
In the event a litigant argues that there is a state statute that compels an election 
official to investigate a congressional candidate’s qualifications, then that state statute 
would be held up to the standards in Part IV.B below. But there is no independent 
constitutional obligation for a state to make such an investigation. Whether a state 
statute requires it, and whether that statute is constitutionally permissible, is the subject 
of the next Part, which will establish that there is no power for the state to exclude a 
candidate from the ballot based on an investigation of her qualifications. 
B. Whether a State May Refuse To Place a Candidate for a House of Congress 
on the Ballot Because It Concludes that the Candidate Is Not Qualified 
Does a state have any role in evaluating the qualifications of candidates for 
Congress? What if it examines a candidate’s qualifications, concludes she is 
ineligible, and wishes to exclude her from the ballot: May the state do so? 
The litigation discussed earlier involving William Higgs and Jim McCrery 
suggests that the state has no role in preventing an allegedly unqualified candidate 
from appearing on the ballot.285 In each case—one instance when an allegedly 
unqualified individual was excluded from the ballot, the other when the individual 
was included—the court erred on the side of allowing the candidate to appear on the 
ballot and of deferring to Congress. It is Congress that holds the sole role in 
determining qualifications; the state has no role. Therefore, the state could not deny 
ballot access to a candidate on the basis of his qualifications. 
The case of Gerald Carlson is in accord. In an effort to fill a seat in a special 
election in 1981, Gerald Carlson filed as a candidate of the “White Majority Party” 
in a Pennsylvania congressional district.286 Although he listed a Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, address on his nomination papers, he had also listed a Michigan 
residence in a Michigan congressional election the same year and testified that he 
“might” “make Philadelphia his permanent residence.”287 
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 285. See supra notes 100–03, 128–29 and accompanying text. 
 286. In re Nomination Papers of Carlson, 430 A.2d 1210, 1211 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981). 
 287. Id. at 1211. But see In re Nomination Petition of Driscoll, 847 A.2d 44, 53–54 (Pa. 
2004) (allowing candidate to amend nomination form to correct address that erroneously 
claimed he lived in the congressional district in which he was running, because candidate did 
not need to reside in the district to run for office, which rendered the error immaterial, and 
because candidate did not intentionally falsify affidavit). 
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The state court avoided the “inhabitant” question even though it “dispute[d] 
Carlson’s Pennsylvania inhabitancy.”288 It found, instead, that nominees for 
Congress must truthfully submit affidavits in compliance with the Election Code; 
that the Election Code required a statement of residency; that Carlson was not a 
resident of Pennsylvania; that Pennsylvania had an interest in “prevent[ing] fraud 
and preserv[ing] the integrity of the election process”; and that Carlson’s defective 
nomination papers would keep him from the ballot.289 There is a tacit recognition 
that the court—and the state—could not exclude the candidate solely because of his 
qualifications (or lack thereof). 
This reasoning is consistent with the Supreme Court’s logic in Roudebush v. 
Hartke.290 In a close election contest in Indiana, Senator R. Vance Hartke was 
declared the winner over Richard L. Roudebush by a margin of 4383 votes.291 Indiana 
law authorized a recount, which Mr. Roudebush sought; but Mr. Hartke claimed that 
the recount procedure ran afoul of the Senate’s power to be “the Judge of the 
Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.”292 
The Court reasoned that the state has a broad power to regulate the election of 
Senators.293 Unless Congress acts, it is left to the states as to the manner of election 
regulation. And a state-authorized recount, the Court concluded, did not usurp the 
power of the Senate to evaluate the “Elections” or “Returns”: 
[A] recount can be said to ‘usurp’ the Senate’s function only if it 
frustrates the Senate’s ability to make an independent final judgment. A 
recount does not prevent the Senate from independently evaluating the 
election any more than the initial count does. The Senate is free to accept 
or reject the apparent winner in either count, and, if it chooses, to conduct 
its own recount.294 
This power is a narrow one; states cannot interfere with Congress’s ability to make 
an independent judgment, and states can only engage in a ministerial manner, not an 
adjudicative manner.295 
If a state refuses to put a candidate on the ballot because it believes the candidate 
for a house of Congress is not qualified, that state is effectively usurping the function 
of Congress. When the state makes its own independent evaluation, it is preventing the 
House or Senate from evaluating that candidate in the event she is elected.296 
                                                                                                                 
 
 288. Carlson, 430 A.2d at 1211. 
 289. Id. at 1212. 
 290. 405 U.S. 15 (1972). 
 291. Id. at 16–17. 
 292. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
 293. Roudebush, 405 U.S. at 24 (citing U.S. CONST. art I, § 4, cl. 1); accord Arizona v. 
Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253 (2013). 
 294. Roudebush, 405 U.S. at 25–26; see also Joshua A. Douglas, Procedural Fairness in 
Election Contests, 88 IND. L.J. 1, 24–26 (2013) (describing Congress’s power to evaluate 
elections and state accommodation of Congress’s role). 
 295. Kristen R. Lisk, Note, The Resolution of Contested Elections in the U.S. House of 
Representatives: Why State Courts Should Not Help with the House Work, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1213, 1223 (2008). 
 296. This is in contrast to a vacancy. In the House, “When vacancies happen in the 
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Admittedly, it is a somewhat unusual concept: Congress does not have the power 
to adjudicate the qualifications of candidates; it has the power to adjudicate the 
qualifications of its own members. But an individual becomes a member through an 
election, and any adjudication about whether someone is qualified to become a 
member, before or after that election, would effectively usurp Congress’s role and 
prevent it from independently evaluating the qualifications of its members. 
                                                                                                                 
 
Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election 
to fill such Vacancies.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4. The Senate provision originally stated, 
“if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise,” id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2, until amended: “When 
vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of 
such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies . . . .” Id. amend. XVII. These 
provisions contemplate a much more active role for the states. And that is consistent with the 
practices of Congress. See, e.g., JOHN V. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, 
AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 111-157, at 9–13 (2011) 
(interpreting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4) (“Vacancies are caused by death, resignation, 
declination, withdrawal, or by action of the House in declaring a vacancy as existing or causing 
one by expulsion. . . . It was long the practice to notify the executive of the State when a 
vacancy was caused by the death of a Member . . . . [I]t is now the practice for State authorities 
to take cognizance of the vacancies without notice.”). The trend for those elected but who died 
before being seated has been to declare a vacancy after the certificate of election has been 
presented. See DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 
94-661, § 4.6 (1976). 
States have frequently reached their own conclusion that a vacancy exists. Consider Mel 
Carnahan, the Governor of Missouri who was posthumously elected to the Senate in 2000. 
Lieutenant Governor Roger B. Wilson named Mr. Carnahan’s widow, Jean Carnahan, to the 
seat. But instead of submitting the certificate of election to the Senate and allowing the Senate 
to declare a vacancy, Mr. Wilson submitted a “certificate of appointment” to the Senate on 
January 3, 2001, the first day of the term. 147 CONG. REC. 3 (2001). The Senate accepted this 
certificate and seated Ms. Carnahan. A similar event occurred after Clement Woodnutt Miller 
was posthumously elected to the House in 1962. California did not transmit a certificate of 
election to the House for the first day of the session in 1963. See 109 CONG. REC. 10–11 (1963). 
Instead, it simply seated Donald H. Clausen on January 28, 1963, after California held a special 
election. 109 CONG. REC. 1120 (1963). 
In uncertain cases, Congress has played a more active role. Nick Begich of Alaska and 
Hale Boggs of Louisiana were posthumously elected in 1972, after they had died in a plane 
crash in Alaska. Their bodies had not been found by the first day of the congressional session 
and they were presumed dead. But as the State of Louisiana expressed uncertainty about what 
ought to occur, it was left to Congress to decide whether the seats were vacant, and the House 
ultimately concluded that they were. 119 CONG. REC. 11–16 (1973). 
And even in the event that a state acts unilaterally with regard to a perceived vacancy, 
Congress can reverse that decision. In 1808, Charles Turner, Jr. did not win a majority of votes 
for a seat in Congress because Massachusetts concluded that votes cast for “Charles Turner, 
junior, esq.” were distinct from votes cast for “Charles Turner, esq.” Massachusetts declared 
a vacancy because no candidate obtained a majority of the vote as required under state law. In 
the second election, William Baylies won. But after Mr. Baylies was seated, the House of 
Representatives examined the election returns from the first election and concluded that votes 
for “Charles Turner, junior, esq.” and “Charles Turner, esq.” should both count. HINDS’ 
PRECEDENTS, supra note 19, § 646. Congress rejected the results of the second election and 
seated Mr. Turner. 
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It would be an overstatement to invoke the breadth of the right to vote provided in 
Reynolds v. Sims: “The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the 
essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of 
representative government.”297 But the argument is not far from the principles that 
drove the Founders to ensure that the legislature would be the sole examiner of the 
qualifications of its members—it would protect the right of the people to elect the 
representatives of their choice without meddling from other actors.298 
Dicta from the Supreme Court is not entirely consistent with this view. In Storer 
v. Brown, the Court considered California’s version of a “sore loser” law that 
prevented a candidate from running as an independent in the general election if he 
had affiliated with a party in the prior year.299 Congressional candidates Thomas 
Storer and Laurence Frommhagen were barred from the ballot, and the law was 
upheld as constitutional.300 When Messrs. Storer and Frommhagen tried to challenge 
other provisions of the election law, the Court rejected them: they had been validly 
barred from the ballot, so other provisions relating to their candidacy or the 
candidacy of others could not be challenged.301 It reasoned that the statute 
is an absolute bar to candidacy, and a valid one. The District Court need 
not have heard a challenge to these other provisions of the California 
Elections Code by one who did not satisfy the age requirement for 
becoming a member of Congress and there was no more reason to 
consider them at the request of Storer and Frommhagen or at the request 
of voters who desire to support unqualified candidates.302 
The Court’s dicta cannot be correct. The lesser problem is that this example is 
purely hypothetical and unrelated to the case before the Court: the parties met the 
age requirement; there was no evidence that California ballot-access law allowed the 
exclusion of underage congressional candidates; and the example was used in the 
context of explaining why the Court would not consider other challenges once a valid 
exclusion applied, not the context of explaining the validity of the exclusion itself. 
But the greater problem is that it flatly belies the practice of the states and of 
Congress examining the qualifications of potentially unqualified candidates, including 
candidates who did not satisfy the age requirement.303 Candidates who did not meet 
the age requirement at the time of election, for instance, have had no difficulty serving 
in Congress, in no small part because Congress has interpreted the provision to mean 
that a candidate must meet the age requirement when seated.304 And among those who 
did not meet the age requirement on the first day of the term, Congress has delayed 
                                                                                                                 
 
 297. 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 
 298. See supra notes 167–72 and accompanying text. 
 299. 415 U.S. 724, 726–27 (1974). 
 300. Id. at 736. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. at 737. 
 303. See supra notes 171–90 and accompanying text (describing instances in which 
electors in states elected potentially unqualified candidates to Congress, and Congress’s role 
in evaluating their qualifications). 
 304. See supra notes 177–81 and accompanying text. 
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resolution of the matter and seated them when they presented themselves at the time 
they came of age.305 Congress’s treatment illustrates that it has handled the matter of 
qualifications—including age—in a manner that is not readily discernible to a state 
administrator deciding which candidates to include on or exclude from the ballot. 
Nothing prevents Congress from revisiting its precedents, and this ability illustrates 
that the Court’s example in Storer is not a precise statement. Reserving this role to 
Congress in the first instance is essential to protect Congress’s power. 
Finally, what of the “obviously” unqualified candidate? What if someone sought to 
put a pet dog on the ballot—or a corporation?306 The state would appear to have some 
interest in ballot integrity in excluding obviously unqualified candidates. Its ordinary 
ballot-integrity mechanisms, such as signature requirements and filing fees, would 
generally be adequate to ensure that obviously unqualified candidates remain off the 
ballot.307 Even then, the state’s mechanisms are not about the evaluation of 
qualifications. They are mechanisms designed to establish a “preliminary showing of 
substantial support” before a candidate obtains ballot access.308 The state has a 
compelling interest in “preserving the integrity of the electoral process and in regulating 
the number of candidates on the ballot,”309 by preventing, for example, “voter confusion, 
ballot overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous candidacies,”310 and it may implement 
that interest with a prerequisite showing of support.311 And it does not call into question 
the non-qualifications-based administration of elections and ballot access. 
But reasonable restrictions showing a prerequisite of support are different from 
independent investigations by the state as to a candidate’s qualifications. Admittedly, 
such an investigation would go toward the “frivolous candidacies” interest—but it 
would assume that the state has the power, the means of implementing that interest, 
by evaluating qualifications. Because such independent investigations would 
interpose the state between the voters and the ability of Congress to evaluate its own 
members, they are not within the scope of state power—that is a matter reserved to 
Congress and to the people.312 
                                                                                                                 
 
 305. See id. 
 306. See Robert Siegel, Maryland PR Firm Runs for Congress, NPR (Mar. 16, 2010), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124742358. 
 307. See, e.g., Murray Hill Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections (Md. State Bd. 
Elections Apr. 21, 2010), available at http://www.elections.state.md.us/vote_act_2002
/documents/Murray%20Hill%20-%20Final%20Determination%20April%2023%202010.pdf 
(concluding that because Murray Hill Inc. was not an “individual,” it could not register to vote, 
which would ultimately preclude the corporation from appearing on the Republican primary 
ballot for congressional office, see Siegel, supra note 306); see also MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. 
LAW § 5-202 (West 2014) (requiring a candidate for public office to be a registered voter). 
This statute should not be over-read, as it would, strictly speaking, add a qualification to office 
(registered voter), because there are potential candidates who meet the constitutional 
requirements but could not register to vote, such as imprisoned felons. 
 308. See, e.g., Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194 (1986); Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983); Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 
(1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971). 
 309. Munro, 479 U.S. at 194. 
 310. Id. at 194–95.  
 311. See id. 
 312. Even if one rejects the strong version of this claim—that is, that the state lacks the 
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C. Whether a State May Include a Possibly Unqualified 
Presidential Candidate on the Ballot 
In presidential elections, the context changes from the first two inquiries. First, there 
is an intermediary electing party: The presidential electors are the ones responsible for 
voting for President and Vice President, not the people voting on Election Day.313 And 
while every state currently authorizes the people to vote for the presidential and vice 
presidential ticket, they are actually voting for a slate of electors.314 
Second, the primary election responsibility is with the state legislature, not “the 
people.”315 “The people” are the ones responsible for electing members to the House 
of Representatives316 and the Senate.317 When it comes to presidential elections, 
“[e]ach state shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,” its 
presidential electors.318 The Court has repeatedly recognized that this power is 
extremely broad.319 At the same time, the Court has noted that there is a unique 
federal interest in presidential elections.320 
Third, the state is actually administering two sets of elections: the state 
administers the vote by the people for presidential electors, and the vote by the 
electors for the President and Vice President.321 
Fourth, Congress is expressly given the role of “judg[ing]” the qualifications, 
elections, and returns of its members.322 In the context of the President and Vice 
                                                                                                                 
 
power to evaluate qualifications for federal candidates—a weaker version of this claim would 
still stand. If the state excludes a candidate from the ballot based on its conclusion concerning 
the candidate’s qualifications, Congress might refuse to seat the winner of that election. 
Congress could independently conclude that the state’s judgment was wrong, and that the 
election had been tainted by the exclusion of a qualified candidate, drawing upon precedents 
from the Civil War and Reconstruction period. See CHAFETZ, supra note 167, at 181–87. 
Special thanks to Josh Chafetz for pressing me on this point. 
 313. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; id. amend. XII. 
 314. Id. amend. XII. 
 315. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature 
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . . .”). 
 316. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
 317. Id. amend. XVII. 
 318. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 319. E.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“[T]he state legislature’s power to select 
the manner for appointing electors is plenary . . . . When the state legislature vests the right to 
vote for President in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental 
. . . .”); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892) (accepting as a premise that “the legislature 
possesses plenary authority to direct the manner of appointment, and might itself exercise the 
appointing power by joint ballot or concurrence of the two houses, or according to such mode as 
designated”); see also Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2269 n.2 
(2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Constitutional avoidance is especially appropriate in this area 
because the [National Voter Registration Act] purports to regulate presidential elections, an area 
over which the Constitution gives Congress no authority whatsoever.”). 
 320. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794–95 (1983)). 
 321. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2, 4; id. amend. XII. 
 322. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
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President, Congress’s role is ostensibly more limited: it is tasked with the duty to 
“count[]” the votes of the electors.323 
In an election for Congress, the people—in an election administered by the state—
select a member of Congress, who is seated after her qualifications have been judged 
by Congress.324 In an election for President, the state legislature directs the manner 
of the election: today, by means of a popular election by the people, administered by 
the state, to elect electors, who later elect the President and Vice President and whose 
votes are counted by Congress before inauguration.325 Earlier, this Article concluded 
that states have no obligation to investigate the qualifications of candidates for 
Congress. What about for the office of President? 
States have been historically generous to presidential candidates seeking ballot 
access. Openly unqualified candidates have regularly appeared on the ballot 
(admittedly, usually toiling in obscurity as minor party candidates with limited ballot 
access), including James B. Cranfill,326 Eldridge Cleaver,327 Michael Zagarell,328 
Linda Jenness,329 Andrew Pulley,330 Larry Holmes,331 Gloria La Riva,332 Róger 
Calero,333 Arrin Hawkins,334 and Peta Lindsay.335 And in situations where the 
candidate is not openly unqualified, but the candidate’s qualifications are contested, 
states have tended to permit the candidate to remain on the ballot despite such 
litigation challenges.336 
                                                                                                                 
 
 323. Id. amend. XII. 
 324. See, e.g., supra Part III.B.1. 
 325. See, e.g., supra Part III.B.2. 
 326. 1892, Prohibition Party vice presidential candidate, thirty-three years old. 
 327. 1968, Peace and Freedom Party presidential candidate, thirty-three years old. 
 328. 1968, Communist Party USA vice presidential candidate, twenty-three years old. 
 329. 1972, Socialist Workers Party presidential candidate, thirty-three years old. 
 330. 1972, Socialist Workers Party vice presidential candidate, nineteen years old; 1980, 
Socialist Workers Party presidential candidate, twenty-seven years old. 
 331. 1984, Workers World Party presidential candidate, thirty years old; 1988, Workers 
World Party presidential candidate, thirty-four years old. 
 332. 1984, Workers World Party vice presidential candidate, thirty years old; 1988, 
Workers World Party vice presidential candidate, thirty-four years old. 
 333. 2004 and 2008, Socialist Workers Party presidential candidate, noncitizen. 
 334. 2004, Socialist Workers Party vice presidential candidate, twenty-eight years old. 
 335. 2012, Party for Socialism and Liberation presidential candidate, about thirty-three 
years old. 
 336. The instances involving Dick Cheney, Barack Obama, and John McCain, for example, 
varied in terms of the validity of the arguments regarding their qualifications, but states 
uniformly allowed them on the ballot. See supra notes 122–27, 132–36 and accompanying 
text. Admittedly, these were major party candidates for office, when the state administrative 
apparatus, often operated by members of those major parties, may have a lower incentive to 
police the qualifications of the candidates. 
Further, the Federal Election Commission has explained that existing federal law does not 
prohibit unqualified candidates from registering as “candidates.” See Hassan v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 893 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.D.C. 2012); Maskell Memorandum, supra note 5, at 1 n.3 
(“The Federal Election Commission is authorized by law to administer and seek compliance 
with the campaign finance provisions of federal law for candidates to federal office, and to 
administer and seek compliance with the provisions for public financing of the nomination 
and election of candidates for President, but has no duties or responsibilities with respect to 
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Accordingly, states have had a practice of generous ballot access to presidential 
and vice presidential candidates. That practice suggests that there is no constitutional 
obligation for a state to exclude a presidential candidate from the ballot who may not 
meet the qualifications for federal office. And that understanding of constitutional 
obligations is supported by the mechanism of presidential election. 
First, the decision ultimately resides with presidential electors, not with the voters 
or the state legislature. The names on the ballot are simply a proxy for a slate of 
electors pledged to that candidate.337 The qualifications of the candidates, then, 
strictly speaking, are immaterial, and the true candidates are the presidential electors. 
Granted, there is an understanding that when voters vote for a presidential candidate, 
they expect the electors to vote for that candidate. 
Second, the discretion given to the states is broad.338 The Constitution gives the 
state legislature the plenary power to choose the manner of the appointment of 
electors.339 It places no conditions or obligations on the legislature’s discretion, apart 
from a few other constitutional provisions regarding the right to vote.340 A state’s 
decision to appoint electors who are ostensibly committed to an unqualified 
candidate, then, is within the range of its discretion. After all, as a corollary to the 
first point, the state lacks direct control over the decisions of the electors 
themselves—and it is certainly under no obligation to direct electors to cast votes in 
a particular way. If the state provides a slate of electors identified as being a proxy 
for a pair of candidates, the state is under no constitutional obligation to ensure that 
the candidates are qualified.341 
                                                                                                                 
 
judging or vetting qualifications or eligibility of candidates to federal office. 2 U.S.C. § 437c.”) 
(emphasis in original); Fed. Election Comm’n, Advisory Opinion No. 2011-15 (Sept. 2, 2011), 
available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao?AONUMBER=2011-15.  
 337. Admittedly, if an elector is legally obligated to vote for a pledged candidate, the 
analysis may change. See infra notes 358–61 and accompanying text (describing state’s broad 
power to regulate presidential electors). 
 338. See supra Part IV.A–B. 
 339. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; accord Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam); 
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
 340. See supra notes 279–81 and accompanying text. 
 341. Perhaps the most potent judicial argument against this conclusion arose in Justice Roy 
Moore’s dissent in an Alabama Supreme Court case handling a “birther” lawsuit. McInnish v. 
Bennett, No. 1120465, 2014 WL 1098246 (Ala. Mar. 21, 2014) (Moore, J., dissenting). He 
argued that independent of any state statute, the state election administrator had an obligation 
to investigate the qualifications of presidential candidates. He melded the Supremacy Clause, 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, with the Oaths Clause, id. art. VI, cl. 3, to find a duty for executive 
officers to enforce the Qualifications Clauses. McInnish, 2014 WL 1098246, at *23. This 
argument is a troubling non sequitur. Taking the oath to uphold the Constitution does not 
indicate who is tasked with the duty of enforcing each provision. Some tasks are delegated to 
the states, others to the federal government, and some to different branches of government. 
Simply because the state officials take an oath to uphold the Constitution does not mean that 
they have “the duty to enforce the qualifications clause.” Id. at *26. While Justice Moore 
“would not prescribe the manner” of verifying eligibility, the duty still, in his view, remained 
in the elections administrator. Id. at *27. 
As discussed, the power to review qualifications already resides with the voters, the 
presidential electors, and Congress. See supra Part III. And it may reside in a state official, if 
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Indeed, as Congress debated in the early days of the Republic, it was understood that 
Congress might be presented with votes from presidential electors who cast ballots for 
unqualified candidates.342 But the remedy was not to throttle the state’s manner of its 
selection of electors. Instead, it rested either with Congress or with the electors 
themselves to police the qualifications of candidates.343 Litigants, then, who raise 
“birther”-style challenges have failed to allege a cause of action: the complaint is legally 
insufficient.344 Any lawsuit filed asking a court to enforce Article II has no force,345 and 
it would have the added effect of removing federal jurisdiction from the claims.346 
As discussed with congressional candidates, if a litigant argues that there is a state 
statute that compels an election official to investigate a presidential candidate’s 
qualifications, then that state statute would be held up to the standards in Part IV.D 
below. But, as with congressional elections, there is no independent constitutional 
obligation for a state to make such an investigation. Whether a state statute requires 
it, and whether that statute is constitutionally permissible, are the subjects of the next 
Part. The answer to that question is considerably more complicated than the answer 
for congressional elections. 
D. Whether a State May Refuse To Put a Presidential Candidate on the Ballot 
Because It Concludes the Candidate Is Not Qualified 
Finally, what about the most relevant question in the “birther” context: For 
candidates like Mr. McCain, born in the Canal Zone,347 or potential candidates like 
Senator Ted Cruz, born in Canada,348 what if a state examines the qualifications of a 
presidential or vice presidential candidate and chooses to exclude that candidate from 
the ballot? Does the state have the power to do so? 
To restate earlier observations, the state legislature has a unique role in the 
selection of presidential electors.349 It also administers both the people’s election of 
electors and the electors’ election of the President and Vice President.350 
Unlike in congressional elections, Congress is not tasked with the unique 
responsibility of adjudicating the qualifications of presidential candidates. It has 
                                                                                                                 
 
the state legislature so directs. See infra Parts IV.D, V. But it is not a duty inherent in the office 
of an election administrator to investigate qualifications. Indeed, to do so might usurp the 
power of the state legislature to select the manner of appointment. 
 342. See supra notes 207–24 and accompanying text. 
 343. See supra notes 225–54 and accompanying text. 
 344. It is possible that a state statute demands a different level of investigation, but that is 
addressed infra at Part V. 
 345. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Robinson v. 
Bowen, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 08CV03836) (alleging four of six causes 
of action arise under Article II of the United States Constitution). 
 346. Even if a state cause of action remained—for example, a state law that required 
presidential candidates to meet federal constitutional qualifications—a strong case could be 
made that there is still no federal question. 
 347. See, e.g., supra note 4. 
 348. See, e.g., supra note 7. 
 349. See supra notes 338–46 and accompanying text. 
 350. See supra note 321 and accompanying text. 
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done so,351 but there is no suggestion that it must be the sole party to do so—
particularly given the fact that its very authority to do so has been questioned.352 If a 
state chooses to evaluate the qualifications of presidential candidates, there is no 
inherent power of Congress standing in its way, and no precedent similar to 
Roudebush that might cabin the choices of a state. 
Just as there was historical precedent for states including unqualified candidates 
on the presidential ballot, so, too, is there precedent for states excluding unqualified 
candidates from the ballot. In fact, there has been a trend of state regulation 
increasingly scrutinizing the qualifications of presidential candidates, even apart 
from pending legislation in the “birther” context.353 
Historically, unqualified candidates appeared regularly on the ballot. An underage 
James Cranfill was the vice presidential nominee of the Prohibition Party in 1892, 
when the party appeared on the ballot of forty-one states.354 But when noncitizen Mr. 
Calero sought ballot access in 2004 and 2008, he obtained access in only seven 
states,355 while a stand-in ticket naming James Harris as the presidential candidate 
for the electors of the Socialist Workers Party took his place in eleven jurisdictions.356 
Underage 2012 candidate Ms. Lindsay appeared on the ballot in nine states, but was 
excluded elsewhere, most notably California.357 States, then, are divided in recent 
practice as to whether they will independently investigate the qualifications of 
members for a federal office. 
Indeed, the state legislature’s increased responsibility in selecting presidential 
electors suggests that it has a higher degree of control over the process. State 
legislatures likely have the power to direct electors to support a candidate and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 351. See supra notes 227–36 and accompanying text (discussing the case of Horace 
Greeley); supra notes 253–54 and accompanying text (discussing the sense of the Senate 
regarding the qualifications of Senator John McCain). 
 352. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 353. See infra notes 354–57 and accompanying text. 
 354. DONALD R. DESKINS, JR., HANES WALTON, JR., & SHERMAN C. PUCKETT, 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1789–2008, at 249 (2010). 
 355. Connecticut (2004 and 2008), Delaware (2008), Minnesota (2004 and 2008), 
Nebraska (2004), New Jersey (2004 and 2008), New York (2004 and 2008), and Vermont 
(2004 and 2008). See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2004: ELECTION RESULTS 
FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 27–39 
(2005), available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federalelections2004.pdf [hereinafter 
FEC REPORT 2004]; FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2008: ELECTION RESULTS 
FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 27–40 
(2009), available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federalelections2008.pdf [hereinafter 
FEC REPORT 2008]. 
 356. California (2008), Colorado (2004 and 2008), the District of Columbia (2004), Florida 
(2004 and 2008), Georgia (2008), Iowa (2004 and 2008), Louisiana (2004 and 2008), 
Mississippi (2004), Utah (2004), Washington (2004 and 2008), and Wisconsin (2004). See 
FEC REPORT 2004, supra note 355; FEC REPORT 2008, supra note 355. 
 357. Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, and Washington. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2012: ELECTION 
RESULTS FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
27–40 (2013), available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalelections2012.pdf; see 
also Lindsay v. Bowen, 750 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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penalize them (or replace them) if they fail to do so.358 They arguably have the power 
to add qualifications to candidates seeking the office of President.359 The less 
intrusive step of examining existing constitutional qualifications is likely within the 
purview of state control. This result differs from the process regarding congressional 
candidates of dubious qualifications, which is a matter not for the states to decide, 
but for the people and Congress.360 And this distinction is sensible given the 
difference in responsibilities granted to the state legislatures in presidential elections 
and congressional elections. 
 And just as voters—the primary party responsible for the selection of members 
of Congress—may independently exercise their judgment, the state legislatures have 
the same authority to independently exercise judgment as to the qualifications of 
presidential candidates (or those candidates whom electors pledge support to). And 
because the legislatures may choose the manner by which it selects its electors, it 
follows that it may restrict the discretion of the election process through an ex ante 
examination of candidates’ qualifications. 
At first blush, ballot-access rules have not always borne out this distinction: 
candidates seeking ballot access as presidential candidates are usually treated to the 
same protections as candidates for other federal or state offices under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.361 But these amendments are external constraints on the 
states’ election processes.362 And these processes are not attempts by the state to 
abide by the terms of the Constitution. Unless the state’s process independently 
breaches some other constitutional guarantee—such as an election law that severely 
restricts a voter’s rights but is not narrowly drawn to advance a compelling state 
interest363—then the state’s examination of a presidential candidate’s qualifications 
is permissible.364 
There are no constitutional provisions that would otherwise independently 
constrain such an examination. The 20th Amendment does not prevent a state from 
excluding a presidential or a vice presidential candidate who is not qualified to hold 
the office.365 It certainly gives an (unnamed) entity the power to evaluate the 
qualifications of the President-elect and Vice President-elect in the event that a 
candidate fails to qualify.366 But that power is not an exclusive power reserved to some 
                                                                                                                 
 
 358. See Ross & Josephson, supra note 157, at 695–704 (describing bases under which 
electors may be bound by state law, including interpretations of the Constitution made by 
Congress and the Supreme Court). Indeed, state legislatures might prohibit electors from 
voting for an unqualified candidate, a postelection means of evaluating qualifications. 
 359. See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 360. See supra Part IV.A–B. 
 361. See, e.g., Lindsay, 750 F.3d at 1063–65 (examining First and Fourteenth Amendment 
claims for presidential candidate). 
 362. See Muller, supra note 92, at 387 (noting that, despite broad discretion for states to 
administer presidential elections, state legislatures’ decisions are still subject to other 
provisions of the Constitution). 
 363. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). 
 364. See supra notes 358–60 and accompanying text. 
 365. See, e.g., Lindsay, 750 F.3d at 1065; Socialist Workers Party of Ill. v. Ogilvie, 357 F. 
Supp. 109, 113 (N.D. Ill. 1972). 
 366. See supra notes 247–54 and accompanying text. 
2015] SCRUTINIZING FEDERAL ELECTORAL QUALIFICATIONS 605 
 
other branch of government. Unlike the robust history of the power of the legislature 
to adjudicate the qualifications of its own members367 and the textual language 
ensuring that each house of Congress is the “sole” judge of the qualifications of its 
members,368 the power of Congress to examine the qualifications of executive 
candidates is, at the very best, debatable,369 and certainly not exclusive.370 
The inconsistency of the cases in this area reveals the problem with the existing 
legal framework. When an ineligible presidential candidate seeks ballot access, the 
courts defer to the state’s exclusion of the candidate on the ground that it has a 
legitimate basis in preserving the integrity of the ballot.371 In contrast, when litigants 
seek to strip an allegedly ineligible presidential candidate of his place on the ballot, 
courts generally refuse to require the state to investigate this question, calling it a 
question for Congress in the first place.372 It cannot be both—either the matter is left 
exclusively to Congress, outside the purview of the states, or it is within some control 
of states to regulate.373 
The case may appear different if an openly unqualified candidate, like Mr. Hassan 
or Ms. Lindsay, demands a place on the ballot, flatly flouting constitutional 
qualifications and seeking to make Congress the sole judge. There, courts have upheld 
                                                                                                                 
 
 367. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 368. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 552 (1969). 
 369. See John D. Feerick, Commentary, A Response to Akhil Reed Amar’s Address on 
Applications and Implications of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 41, 58 (2010) 
(noting that the Twelfth Amendment requires Congress to perform the nondiscretionary act of 
counting electoral votes, and suggesting that the 20th amendment does not include an 
opportunity for congressional investigation). Indeed, the language may well suggest that “fail 
to qualify” refers to an issue of timing, such as a failure to resolve the winner through counting 
or otherwise, rather than an issue of meeting the constitutional qualifications. See also supra 
notes 223–46 and accompanying text (stating the argument predating the 20th Amendment); 
cf. William Josephson, Senate Election of the Vice President and House of Representatives 
Election of the President, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 597, 617 (2009) (discussing the timing 
mechanisms built into the 20th Amendment). 
 370. But see Robinson v. Bowen, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“[T]he 
challenge presented by plaintiff is committed under the Constitution to the electors and the 
legislative branch, at least in the first instance. Judicial review—if any—should occur only 
after the electoral and Congressional processes have run their course.”); Keyes v. Bowen, 117 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 207, 208 (Ct. App. 2010) (“The presidential nominating process is not subject to 
each of the 50 states’ election officials independently deciding whether a presidential nominee 
is qualified, as this could lead to chaotic results.”); Jordan v. Reed, No. 12-2-01763-5, 2012 
WL 4739216 (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 2012) (“The primacy of congress to resolve issues of a 
candidate’s qualifications to serve as president is established in the U.S. Constitution . . . .”). 
 371. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (Peta Lindsay); supra notes 111–17 and 
accompanying text (Abdul Hassan). 
 372. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text (Obama); supra notes 132–33 and 
accompanying text (McCain). 
 373. This tension may arise, in part, because the question is sometimes framed as a matter 
of whether there is a constitutional duty, independent of a state statute, to make such an 
inquiry. This Article has concluded that there is no duty. See supra Part IV.C. But in the event 
the state does have such a statute obligating an election official to investigate qualifications, 
and the official has either failed to enforce it or had her decision challenged in litigation, the 
tension is stark—either the state may make such an inquiry, or it may not. 
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the exclusion from the ballot.374 The “extremely unconstitutional” presidential 
candidate—like a plot to put a dog on the ballot375—could be excluded from the ballot 
by appropriate state action. But in the cases of the arguably unqualified candidate 
included on the ballot, courts are generally not adjudicating the merits of qualification 
questions (at least, those questions that survive a standing inquiry)376: they are 
adjudicating these questions on the basis of deference to Congress—which is the 
wrong inquiry. It should, instead, be based on what the state legislature has done (or 
failed to do) when it authorizes the investigation of qualifications. 
A state inquiry into qualifications could take one of several forms.377 It might be 
simply ministerial, requiring candidates to verify that they are qualified. It could 
include a certification, such as a signature under penalty of perjury affirming that one 
meets the qualifications. It may require a low level of verification, such as an 
attachment of copies of documentary support for proof of residence and citizenship. Or 
it may require a high level of verification, such as original source documents (like a 
“long-form birth certificate”). The inquiry might be required as a disclosure when a 
candidate seeks to file for office, or as one that an election official is authorized to make 
under certain circumstances. Such state regulations would be permissible as long as 
they simultaneously existed within other constitutional boundaries. 
For instance, when Mr. Hassan was excluded from Colorado’s ballot, he sued to 
seek ballot access.378 Judge Neil Gorsuch, on behalf of a panel of the Tenth Circuit, 
explained that “a state’s legitimate interest in protecting the integrity and practical 
functioning of the political process permits it to exclude from the ballot candidates 
who are constitutionally prohibited from assuming office,”379 citing Munro v. 
Socialist Workers Party380 and Bullock v. Carter.381 It is wholly within state authority 
to evaluate the qualifications of presidential candidates, and it may exclude such 
candidates as long as the means comply with the typical balancing of the state’s 
interest with the candidate’s burden.382 In the case of an obviously unqualified 
candidate, the balance is relatively easy. 
And when Ms. Lindsay was excluded from California’s ballot, Chief Judge Alex 
Kozinski, on behalf of a panel of the Ninth Circuit, found California within its right 
to exclude.383 It elided whether California’s statute authorized the Secretary of State 
to make such an inquiry,384 and it went on to conclude that the state’s interest in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 374. See supra notes 107–18 and accompanying text. 
 375. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Bill Clinton Unconstitutional? The Case for President 
Strom Thurmond, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 217, 222 (1996). 
 376. See supra notes 137–41 and accompanying text. 
 377. See infra notes 391–96 and accompanying text (discussing variety of existing state 
statutes). 
 378. Hassan v. Colorado, 495 F. App’x 947, 948–49 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 379. Id. at 948. 
 380. 479 U.S. 189, 193–95 (1986). 
 381. 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972). 
 382. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 383. Lindsay v. Bowen, 750 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 384. California law provides that “[t]he Secretary of State shall see that elections are 
efficiently conducted and that state election laws are enforced.” CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§ 12172.5(a) (West 2013). It also states, “The Secretary of State may adopt regulations to 
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protecting the integrity of the ballot justified the exclusion, particularly given that 
Ms. Lindsay’s qualifications were not in dispute.385 
Once a state adjudicates federal qualifications, the next inquiry is the remedy for 
a candidate left off the ballot. As a remedy, he may go to court; after all, the state 
legislature, like Congress, does not have an exclusive role in adjudicating the 
qualifications of presidential candidates.386 And there is nothing that precludes the 
judiciary’s role, particularly ex ante, when the state’s regulatory apparatus has 
excluded a candidate from the ballot.387 
After a state has signaled its willingness to review the qualifications of a 
presidential candidate, it proceeds through a state law that codifies the federal 
constitutional qualifications. The constitutional qualifications, as discussed earlier, 
do not compel a state to act upon them. Any force they have in terms of ballot access 
must come through a state law.388 
In the alternative, a state may have such a statute, but the election official might 
examine a candidate’s qualifications, conclude she meets them, and include her on 
the ballot.389 In the event that a litigant challenges the election official’s judgment to 
                                                                                                                 
 
ensure the uniform application and administration of state election laws.” Id. § 12172.5(d). 
Further, California law provides that a candidate “shall” be placed on the ballot if she is one 
generally advocated for as a candidate of the Peace and Freedom Party. CAL. ELEC. CODE 
§ 6720 (West 2003). But the Ninth Circuit declined to address these interpretations of state 
law, concluding that “it has no bearing on this lawsuit, which is based entirely on federal law.” 
Lindsay, 750 F.3d at 1064. 
 385. Lindsay, 750 F.3d at 1064. 
 386. See, e.g., supra Part III (describing various roles). 
 387. The question of judicial review may be admittedly more challenging if Congress is 
the body that finds a President-elect or Vice President-elect unqualified. 
 388. Whether the candidate could litigate in federal court is another matter. There is no 
obligation under the Constitution to investigate, and the cause of action arises under state law. 
See American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916). But there are 
limited instances in which federal courts may still hear state-based causes of action that 
involve a substantial federal question. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue 
Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005); Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 
(1921); see also Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 
777 (2004); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., A Neo-Federalist Analysis of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 
95 CAL. L. REV. 1515 (2007); cf. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (finding no federal 
jurisdiction to hear a state-based cause of action where the federal issue in the case was not 
substantial). But see supra note 384 (Ninth Circuit declining to address questions of state law 
where underlying actions were based on federal law). Perhaps given a special federal interest 
in presidential elections, and a need for a uniform interpretation of the Constitution, a federal 
forum would be appropriate. The most salient presidential election disputes, however, have 
often begun in state court and ended in the Supreme Court under its appellate jurisdiction. See, 
e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam) (appeal from the Florida Supreme Court); 
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892) (appeal from the Michigan Supreme Court). Such 
resolution is beyond the scope of this Article, save the advice given to courts interpreting state 
statutes. See infra Part V. 
 389. See, e.g., supra notes 132–36 and accompanying text (noting ballot access universally 
granted to Messrs. McCain and Obama despite litigation). Admittedly, these were major party 
candidates for office, when the state administrative apparatus, often operated by members of 
those major parties, may have had a lower incentive to police the qualifications of the candidates. 
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include the candidate—assuming justiciability can be met—the scenario looks 
slightly different. The court may potentially exclude a candidate based on its 
independent judgment that the candidate is unqualified—subject to limitations 
discussed below.390 
States, then, have no role in adjudicating the qualifications of congressional 
candidates. They are not obligated to investigate the qualifications of presidential 
candidates. But they may enact legislation that authorizes election officials to 
investigate the qualifications of presidential candidates, and courts may review those 
decisions. What states and courts are actually doing is another matter. 
V. A NEW APPROACH TO QUALIFICATIONS LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION 
States’ approaches to examining the qualifications of federal candidates are 
almost sui generis to each. Some states have no mechanism for their election officials 
to scrutinize qualifications for federal office.391 Some have no certification 
mechanism for President, but require an affidavit certifying eligibility for 
congressional office.392 Others declare in a statute that congressional candidates must 
meet constitutional eligibility and authorize plaintiffs to litigate the legality of a 
candidate appearing on the ballot.393 Some statutes leave the details of these 
                                                                                                                 
 
 390. See infra Part V. 
 391. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-4, -175(b), -379, -465, -467, -469 (West 2009 
& Supp. 2014) (no duty to evaluate qualifications, no authorization to investigate, and no 
requirement that candidates affirm constitutional eligibility); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 302, 
3184, 3301, 4307–4308 (2007 & Supp. 2012) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2701–2702 
(Supp. 2014) (same); Ankeny v. Governor of Ind., 916 N.E.2d 678, 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) 
(“Initially, we note that the Plaintiffs do not cite to any authority recognizing that the Governor 
has a duty to determine the eligibility of a party’s nominee for the presidency.”). 
 392. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 201.221, 202A.11–.20, 208.03 (West 2009 & Supp. 
2014) (no duty to evaluate qualifications, no authorization to investigate, and no requirement 
that presidential or vice presidential candidates affirm eligibility); id. § 204B.06 (requiring 
congressional candidates to file affidavit affirming constitutional eligibility, residency “when 
elected,” and age and citizenship “on the next January 3”). 
 393. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 16-311, -344, -351 (West 2014) (no duty to evaluate 
qualifications, no authorization to investigate, no requirement to affirm eligibility, see Ariz. 
Att’y Gen. Op. I01-109 (2001), but requiring candidates to file an affidavit of qualification, 
and permitting voters to challenge a candidate’s filing of nomination papers); COLO. REV. 
STAT. §§ 1-4-501(1), (3) (West 2014) (requiring candidates to affirm that they meet the 
qualifications of the office and authorizing eligible electors to challenge); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§§ 32-202 to -203, -502 to -503, -624 (2014) (no duty to evaluate qualifications, no 
authorization to investigate, no requirement to affirm eligibility, but requiring congressional 
candidates to meet constitutional eligibility and authorizing state political party committee to 
“institute actions to determine the legality of any candidate for a . . . congressional office”); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:13-10, :23-7, :23-15, :23-16, :29-1 (West 2014) (no duty to evaluate 
qualifications, no authorization to investigate, no requirement that presidential candidates 
affirm eligibility [see Secretary of State’s adoption of administrative law judge’s ruling in 
Purpura-Moran Decision, 2012], requiring congressional candidates to file a certificate stating 
“that he is qualified for the office mentioned in the petition,” and authorizing objections made 
to elections officer if nomination is in violation of law). 
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nominating declarations to an election official.394 Still others require declarations under 
penalty of perjury and leave the decision as to the adequacy of the declaration to an 
election official.395 Ambiguous statutes that discuss “constitutional qualifications” 
have sometimes been read to extend to federal constitutional qualifications and not 
simply state constitutional qualifications for state office.396 
The interpretations of these statutes are not easily comprehensible. Consider 
California, which occasionally has suggested that its election officer’s duties are 
ministerial397 and preclude investigation of a presidential candidate’s 
qualifications.398 But in other contexts, election officials have excluded unqualified 
presidential candidates from the ballot.399 
Since the controversies of 2008, states—whether driven by conspiracy theories or 
by a desire to clarify ambiguous statutes and prepare for the worst—have proposed 
legislation to authorize (or even require) election officials to investigate the 
qualifications of presidential candidates.400 So far, when disputes have arisen in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 394. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-10-201(5)(a) (West 2013) (requiring nomination 
form to include “information prescribed by the secretary of state”); Hassan v. Montana, No. 
CV-11-72-H-DWM-RKS, 2012 WL 8169887, at *1 (D. Mont. May 3, 2012) (noting that the 
nomination form requires a candidate “under penalty of perjury to state that he is a natural 
born citizen of the United States”). 
 395. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 655:17, :17-B, :26, :47 (2014). 
 396. See, e.g., N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 6-122, 16-102 (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2014) 
(prohibiting candidates “who, if elected will not at the time of commencement of the term of 
such office or position, meet the constitutional or statutory qualifications therefore,” and 
authorizing a candidate or party to initiate litigation to enforce); Kryzan v. N.Y. State Bd. of 
Elections, 865 N.Y.S.2d 793 (App. Div. 2008) (applying statutes). 
 397. See, e.g., Felt v. Waughop, 225 P. 862, 864 (Cal. 1924) (“He is not vested with the 
authority or burdened with the duty of ascertaining or determining, either as a matter of fact 
or as a matter of law, whether or not the candidates who thus offer themselves are qualified to 
hold and exercise the offices which they are respectively seeking.”); Wheeler v. Hall, 204 P. 
231, 233 (Cal. 1922) (“It is sufficient to say that we do not think the clerk can raise the 
objection and refuse to place the name on the ballot because of his knowledge, information, 
or belief that the proposed candidate is not eligible to the office . . . .”); McDonald v. Curry, 
110 P. 480, 482 (Cal. 1910) (“Under the law the Secretary of State and the several county 
clerks and registrars are invested with merely ministerial functions . . . .”). 
 398. Keyes v. Bowen, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 207, 215 (Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]he truly absurd 
result would be to require each state’s election official to investigate and determine whether 
the proffered candidate met eligibility criteria of the United States Constitution, giving each 
the power to override a party’s selection of a presidential candidate.”). 
 399. See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text (outlining Eldridge Cleaver’s removal 
from several states’ ballots in 1968); cf. Lindsay v. Bowen, 750 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 400. See, e.g., S. 1526, 50th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012) (requiring a long-form birth 
certificate and other documentation to be attached to the affidavit); H.R. 2177, 50th Leg., 1st 
Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (vetoed by governor, would have required attachment of relevant 
qualification documents to candidate’s affidavit of qualification and empowered the Secretary 
of State and other election officers to adjudicate qualifications); H.R. 2544, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. 
Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (requiring a long-form birth certificate and other documentation to be 
attached to the affidavit); S. 91, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2011); H.R. 336, 2011–2012 Leg. 
Sess. (Vt. 2011), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2012/bills/Intro/H-336.pdf 
(never enacted, would have required candidates for elected office to submit certified copy of 
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litigation, courts have erred on the side of permitting the candidate to appear on the 
ballot to allow Congress to sort out the matter,401 except in cases of “obviously” 
unqualified candidates, where exclusions have been upheld.402 
But legislative and judicial responses to qualifications controversies could be 
greatly simplified with a few rules. 
First, any state attempt to review the qualifications of candidates for 
congressional office is constitutionally forbidden. Existing statutes should be 
construed to preclude such review; to the extent they cannot be so construed, they 
are invalid. Minimal regulations might pass constitutional scrutiny. For instance, a 
state might require that a candidate affirm that she would present herself to Congress 
as a candidate who meets the qualifications for office. But such regulations could not 
interfere with the people’s ability to elect a preferred representative and could not 
interfere with Congress’s ability to evaluate its members.403 
Second, if a litigant attempts to exclude an allegedly unqualified presidential 
candidate from the ballot, he may only do so by citing some state law that compels 
investigation of qualifications and exclusion. In some jurisdictions, like California, 
no such mechanism may exist.404 And because there is no independent constitutional 
obligation to investigate, litigation in such states can end quickly. 
Third, in the event a state statute authorizes or compels investigation of a 
presidential candidate’s qualifications, courts—particularly federal courts—should 
proceed with caution. These cases often involve interpretations of state law about 
whether the Secretary or other election administrators have the power or the duty to 
investigate qualifications. These are not tasks ideally suited for federal courts. 
Assuming a federal court has jurisdiction, the inquiry must proceed carefully. The 
state legislature may have the power to decide to exclude candidates from the ballot 
based on their qualifications, but it is not necessarily the case that it has approved 
rigorous review from election officials, or the courts, in the exercise of that task. And 
because the power to review qualifications exists in at least three other parties—the 
voters, the electors, and, arguably, Congress405—the reluctance to provide an 
additional level of review should be heightened. The political and electoral processes 
                                                                                                                 
 
birth certificate or certificate of naturalization). 
 401. See supra notes 119–36 and accompanying text. 
 402. See supra notes 307–12 and accompanying text.  
 403. See supra notes 290–94 and accompanying text (explaining the Roudebush case). 
 404. See supra note 397 and accompanying text. But see Lindsay v. Bowen, 750 F.3d 1061 
(9th Cir. 2014) (affirming California state election official’s decision to exclude a candidate 
and refusing to examine state law grounds for relief). 
 405. See Grinols v. Electoral Coll., No. 2:12-cv-02997-MCE-DAD, 2013 WL 2294885, at 
*13 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2013) (citing Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), for the 
proposition that “determining a person’s qualifications to serve as President of the United States 
and counting electoral votes [is] within Congress’s jurisdiction”); Keyes v. Bowen, 117 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 207, 208 (Ct. App. 2010) (“Any investigation of eligibility is best left to each party, which 
presumably will conduct the appropriate background check or risk that its nominee’s election 
will be derailed by an objection in Congress, which is authorized to entertain and resolve the 
validity of objections following the submission of the electoral votes.”). 
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are the best repository for this decision making, and courts would only act in the rare 
event of an adjudicatory gap.406 
Fourth, for state legislatures contemplating legislation to address this problem, 
responses should come in the form of clarification rather than additional regulation. 
Given that voters, electors, and Congress already examine the qualifications of 
candidates,407 onerous state-based regulation is not necessary. New regulations should 
purge any investigation of congressional candidates, clarify whether election officials 
are given discretionary or ministerial duties, and, at most, include minimally intrusive 
declarations from candidates. Indeed, the legislature may want to consider the future 
implications of ceding additional investigatory authority to election officers. 
Finally, these tests are wholly independent of ballot-integrity tests under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments. “Burdensome” legislation would still need to survive 
independent examination under the balancing tests articulated in cases like Munro 
and Burdick.408 
Given the explosion of litigation from “birther”-style plaintiffs and proposed 
legislation from skeptical state officials, and the inevitable ongoing debates about the 
qualifications of other candidates for federal office, the power of states to scrutinize 
federal elections is a crucial starting point for any analysis. States lack any power to 
evaluate qualifications in congressional elections, and any power to evaluate 
qualifications in presidential elections arises solely from the force of its own statutes. 
Because of the review of qualifications that occurs in the people, electors, political 
parties, and Congress, the need for the state to review is slight. In many instances, 
they may not need to adjudicate the case at all, as there may be no relevant state 
statute; in others, the scope of scrutiny is small. But courts should acknowledge the 
proper constitutional framework before adjudicating any controversy. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 406. Cf. Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 493, 550 (2013) (arguing 
that courts are the best institution for resolving a religious dispute when “no religious 
institution stands ready to resolve it”). 
 407. See supra note 405 and accompanying text. 
 408. See Lindsay, 750 F.3d 1061, 1064 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 440 n.10 
(1992)); Hassan v. Colorado, 495 F. App’x 947, 948–49 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Munro v. 
Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193–95 (1986)). 
